

5. Novalis

Hymnen an die Nacht
[1800]

5. Novalis: Hymnen an die Nacht [1800]

The fifth section explores the set of poems, 'Hymns to the Night', written by Novalis in 1800.

Introduction

Novalis was the pen name of Georg Philipp Friedrich von Hardenberg (1772 - 1801), who was a founding author, poet, and philosopher of Early Romanticism. He studied at the University of Jena in 1790-94 and became a close friend of Schiller with whom he shared a passion not only for history but also for the ontology of aesthetics, and the notion of an ethics of love.

Novalis began to use a pseudonym, a reference to his medieval ancestors, from the time of the publication of his first works in 1798 in the *Athenäum* magazine, which was a mouthpiece for early Romantic values and aspirations. He published both philosophical papers and poetry, including his most influential work, *Hymns to the Night*.

Theory

Novalis was a man of the affections and he couldn't help but fall in love with the young Sophie von Kuhn. He idolised her and doted on her until, a year later on her thirteenth birthday, she agreed to marry him, and they became engaged. She was considered too young for an immediate marriage according to the prevailing norms, but this didn't prevent Hardenberg from tumbling into rapture in anticipation of their intended life together. She became the enchantment that inspired his quixotic poetry. But a year later she fell gravely ill with tuberculosis. He spent many hours at her bedside, joined by many of his and the family friends: Goethe, Schelling, and Wilhelm and Caroline Schlegel. But in early 1797, two days after her fifteenth birthday, she died.

Novalis was heartbroken and for several years, up until his own death to tuberculosis four years later, he suffered from deep sorrow at the tragedy of what had happened. His set of poems, 'Hymns to the Night' is an expression of grief, but also of themes he came to associate with Sophie's death and transfiguration. At her graveside there was epiphany. There was the supreme union between two spirits in the divine realms, the domain of the absolute. The surface light of the sun became the real world, and the tenderness of the girl revealed a heavenly womb that was the night world. In the sublime night of the soul, the poet was reunited with his beloved, and thereafter she was brought to resurrection. The self and nature came into being simultaneously.

Beneath the contingent chaos, beyond the loss and despair and the lingering anguish, beyond the injustice of mortality, lay the enduring realm, infinite in spirit, transcendent, exultant over death. It was located in the ecstasy itself, that which teases the furtive veil of reality, that which is the unifying absolute.

If in the dark night of the soul's misery there is the quest for the essence of the divine, then upon returning to the light of nature there shall be the quest for the underlying essence of the laws of nature too.

Indeed, Novalis was not just a mystical poet. He had studied law at Jena among committed Kantians and was well aware of contemporary debates concerning the nature of existence. He was a self-reliant thinker and soon he developed his own approach. Revitalised, energized, he developed ideas that would be picked up later by others to become absolute idealism.

Novalis contested the principles of subjective idealism. He argued that Fichte's metaphysics was unable to explain the organic development of nature, or the orderly concord to be found in the empirical sciences. Its weakness lay in its reliance on rational theory. Sophie's death had revealed the superficiality of rationality. She had enabled him to see that reason must inevitably end in ignorance because the absolute surpasses the comprehension of rational thought.

Novalis argued for the privileging of a magical element of thought, a Magical Idealism. He argued that poetry and religion were, in the end, reformulations of the same doctrines espoused by philosophy or science yet they possessed a more mystical quality that made them, in essence, more representative of the absolute.

Continuing from Herder, Novalis argued that it was only the poetic imagination that could fathom the absolute. In particular he refuted the foundations of Kant's transcendental method and epistemic foundationalism in general. Existence was a mystery that was better expressed through art than through ideas. Beauty must be the fundamental criteria for truth in philosophy, and self-realisation the goal of morality, rather than a utilitarianism that neglected individual potential and that treated humanity as passive consumers of pleasure, or a Kantian deontology that again emphasized rationality above sensuality.

Indeed, Novalis was condescending about the ability of human reason to achieve anything, let alone an understanding of the mysteries of life and of the cosmos. And he refuted the assertion that everything was mind. Like Goethe, he was sympathetic to Spinozian realism whereby everything is essentially nature, while retaining his commitment to an idealism that was necessarily fused with realism into a single living whole. He argued that only by achieving the capacity for greatness in a manner that acknowledges the mystical unity of existence is it possible for the poet to fulfil a mission of educating the world and creating a new golden age that would be a paradise of truth and harmony.

Influence

Novalis inspired many others of his era, including Goethe, Zwilling, Huelsen, Hölderlin, the Schlegel brothers, and Schelling, to seek the unity of all endeavours as a mirror for the unity of existence. He showed them how their vitality and passion could be expressed both through empirical work and through the arts, and how their theoretical work could embody both science and philosophy. Their quest for fundamental principles of nature should be represented by an absolute idealism. Later, the work of Novalis was highly valued by Friedrich Nietzsche, Rudolf Steiner and Hermann Hesse, all of whom drew inspiration from the Weimar idealist tradition and its focus upon universal truth.

Pedagogical Questions

1. To what degree can modern natural science inform the creative arts, and vice versa?
2. How is it possible to reconcile universal truth with relativist perspectives on truth?
3. How is it possible for people today to believe in the prospect of a better and more purposive world when the modern theory of natural selection rejects the notion of purposiveness in the natural world?

Quotes

“Once when I was shedding bitter tears, when, dissolved in pain, my hope was melting away, and I stood alone by the barren mound which in its narrow dark bosom hid the vanished form of my Life, lonely as never yet was lonely man, driven by anxiety unspeakable, powerless, and no longer anything but a conscious misery; as there I looked about me for help, unable to go on or to turn back, and clung to the fleeting, extinguished life with an endless longing: then, out of the blue distances -- from the hills of my ancient bliss, came a shiver of twilight -- and at once snapt the bond of birth, the chains of the Light. Away fled the glory of the world, and with it my mourning; the sadness flowed together into a new, unfathomable world. Thou, soul of the Night, heavenly Slumber, didst come upon me; the region gently upheaved itself; over it hovered my unbound, newborn spirit. The mound became a cloud of dust, and through the cloud I saw the glorified face of my beloved. In her eyes eternity reposed. I laid hold of her hands, and the tears became a sparkling bond that could not be broken. Into the distance swept by, like a tempest, thousands of years. On her neck I welcomed the new life with ecstatic tears. Never was there such another dream; then first and ever since I hold fast an eternal, unchangeable faith in the heaven of the Night, and its Light, the Beloved.”

Novalis. *Hymns to the Night* (1800), trans. George Macdonald. LibriVox, 2016.

Introduction to the music

If the music tells of sorrow and grief, then still the trumpets, horn and trombone can intone a purposive chorale affirming that life and death are intertwined notions of existence. The threshold of cessation and oblivion divulges the eternal night, but this in turn reveals how death is the principle of life (bar 17). There is a second hymn, a heraldic fanfare, asserting a higher level of experience and understanding. It is a vision of universal world harmony (bar 49). But still there is the resurgence of anguish and pain. The horn intones of lamentations for the historical supplanting of expository paganism with circumscribed religion (bar 101) and the music concludes in deep uncertainty.

Novalis: Hymnen an die Nacht [1800]

Philip Armstrong

Andante ♩=84

Woodwinds:

- Piccolo
- Flute 1
- Flute 2
- Oboe 1
- Cor Anglais
- Clarinet 1
- Clarinet 2
- Bass Clarinet in Bb
- Bassoon 1
- Contrabassoon

Brass:

- Horn 1
- Horn 2
- Horn 3
- Trumpet 1
- Trumpet 2
- Trumpet 3
- Trombone 1
- Bass Trombone
- Tuba

Percussion:

- Timpani (1:F 2:C 3:Bb 4:G)
- Cymbals (Large suspended cymbal)
- Bass Drum
- Triangle

Strings:

- Violin I
- Violin II
- Viola
- Violoncello
- Contrabass

Performance Instructions:

- Violoncello:** ricochet, bow the bridge while dampening strings (w/out tone)
- Contrabass:** bow the bridge while dampening strings (w/out tone)

Philip Armstrong

A

8

Picc. *p*

Fl. 1 *mf* *p*

Fl. 2 *mf* *p*

Ob. 1 *mf* *mp*

C. A. *mf* *mp*

Cl. 1 *mp*

Cl. 2 *mf* *mp*

B. Cl. *mp*

Bsn. 1 *mp*

Cbsn. *mp*

Hn. 1 *mf* *mp*

Hn. 2 *mf* *mp*

Hn. 3 *mf* *mp*

Tpt. 1 *mf* *mp*

Tpt. 2 *mp*

Tpt. 3

Tbn. 1 *mp*

B. Tbn. *mp*

Tba. *mp*

Timp. *p*

B. D. *mp*

A

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla. *ricochet* *p*

Vc. *p*

Ch. *p*

B Death, the principle of life

14

Picc. *tr*

Fl. 1 *tr*

Fl. 2 *tr*

Ob. 1 *mf* *p*

C. A.

Cl. 1 *mf* *p*

Cl. 2 *mf* *p*

B. Cl. *tr*

Bsn. 1

Cbss.

Hn. 1 *mf* *p*

Hn. 2 *mf*

Hn. 3 *mf*

Tpt. 1 *mf* *p* *tr* *mf*

Tpt. 2 *tr* *mf* *mf*

Tpt. 3 *mp* *mf*

Tbn. 1 *mf*

B. Tbn. *tr* *mf*

Tba. *tr* *mp*

Timp. *tr*

B. D. *tr* *mp*

Tri. *p*

Hp. *mp* *tr* *DCB/EbFGA* *Bb/F#*

B Death, the principle of life

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla. *mf*

Vc. *mf* *tr*

Ch.

C

23

Picc.

Fl. 1

Fl. 2

Ob. 1

C. A.

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn. 1

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn. 1

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp.

B. D.

Tri.

Hp.

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Ch.

24

C

31

Picc. *p*

Fl. 1 *p*

Fl. 2 *p*

Ob. 1

C. A.

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn. 1

Cbss.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn. 1

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp.

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Cb.

D

36

Picc.

Fl. 1

Fl. 2

Ob. 1

C. A.

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn. 1

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn. 1

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp.

Cym.

Tri.

Hp.

D

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Ch.

E

44

Picc. *p* *mf* *f*

Fl. 1 *p* *mf* *f*

Fl. 2 *p* *mf* *f*

Ob. 1 *p* *mf*

C. A. *p* *mp* *p* *mf* *f*

Cl. 1 *p*

Cl. 2 *p*

B. Cl. *p* *mf*

Bsn. 1 *mp* *p* *p*

Cbsn. *p*

Hn. 1 *mp* *p* *p* *mf*

Hn. 2 *p* *p* *mf*

Hn. 3 *p* *p*

Tpt. 1 *mp* *p* *mf* *f*

Tpt. 2 *mp* *p* *mf* *f*

Tpt. 3 *mp* *p* *mf* *f*

Tbn. 1 *mp* *p* *p*

B. Tbn. *mp* *p* *p*

Tba. *mp* *p*

Timp.

B. D. *mp*

Hp.

Vln. I *p* *mf*

Vln. II *p*

Vla. *p*

Vc. *p*

Ch. *p*

E

F A vision of universal world harmony

52

Picc.

Fl. 1

Fl. 2

Ob. 1

C. A.

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn. 1

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn. 1

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp.

Tamb.

Cym.

S. D.

F A vision of universal world harmony

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Ch.

p
 p
 p

H

63

Picc. *f*

Fl. 1 *f*

Fl. 2 *f*

Ob. 1 *f* *p* *f*

C. A. *p* *mp* *f*

Cl. 1 *p*

Cl. 2 *p*

B. Cl. *p*

Bsn. 1 *p* *p*

Cbsn. *p*

Hn. 1 *p* *f*

Hn. 2 *f* *p*

Hn. 3 *f* *p*

Tpt. 1 *f* *p* *f*

Tpt. 2 *f* *p* *f*

Tpt. 3 *f* *p* *f*

Tbn. 1 *f* *p* *p*

B. Tbn. *f* *p*

Tba. *f* *p*

Timp. *f* *tr* *mp* *f*

Tamb. *f* *tr*

Cym. *f* *p* *f*

B. D. *mp*

Vln. I

Vln. II *p*

Vla. *p*

Vc. *p*

Ch. *p*

H

71

I **J**

Picc. *f*

Fl. 1 *f*

Fl. 2 *f*

Ob. 1 *mf* *f*

C. A. *mf*

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn. 1 *f* *mf* *p*

Cbsn. *f* *mf* *p*

Hn. 1 *mf* *p* *f*

Hn. 2 *mf* *f*

Hn. 3 *mf* *f*

Tpt. 1 *f* *mf* *f*

Tpt. 2 *mf* *p* *f*

Tpt. 3 *mf* *f*

Tbn. 1 *f* *mf* *p* *f*

B. Tbn. *f* *mf* *p*

Tba. *f* *mf* *p* *f*

Timp. *f*

Tamb. *f*

S. D. *f*

Hp. *mf* *p*

C₂/E₂/F₂A₂

F₂

I **J**

Vln. I *mf*

Vln. II *mf* *p*

Vla. *mf* *p*

Vc. *mf* *p*

Ch. *mf* *p*

K

78

Picc.

Fl. 1

Fl. 2

Ob. 1

C. A.

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn. 1

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn. 1

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp.

Tamb.

Hp.

K

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Ch.

Philip Armstrong

94

Picc.

Fl. 1

Fl. 2

Ob. 1

C. A.

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn. 1

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn. 1

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp.

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Ch.

p

f

mf

M

90

Picc.

Fl. 1

Fl. 2

Ob. 1

C. A.

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn. 1

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn. 1

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Tim.

Tamb.

Tri.

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Ch.

f

mp

f

mp

f

mp

f

mp

p

M

N Lamentations for the historical supplanting of expository paganism with circumscribed religion

105

Picc.
 Fl. 1
 Fl. 2
 Ob. 1
 C. A.
 Cl. 1
 Cl. 2
 B. Cl.
 Bsn. 1
 Cbsn.
 Hn. 1
 Hn. 2
 Hn. 3
 Tpt. 1
 Tpt. 2
 Tpt. 3
 Tbn. 1
 B. Tbn.
 Tba.
 Timp.
 Cym.

N Lamentations for the historical supplanting of expository paganism with circumscribed religion

Vln. I
 Vln. II
 Vla.
 Vc.
 Ch.

O

115

Picc. *p*

Fl. 1 *p*

Fl. 2 *p*

Ob. 1 *p* *mp* *mf*

C. A. *p* *mp*

Cl. 1 *mp* *mf*

Cl. 2 *p* *mp* *mf*

B. Cl. *mp*

Bsn. 1 *mp*

Cbsn. *mp*

Hn. 1 *p* *mp* *mf* *p*

Hn. 2 *p* *mp* *mf*

Hn. 3 *mp* *mf*

Tpt. 1 *mp* *mf* *p*

Tpt. 2 *mp* *mf*

Tpt. 3 *mp* *mf*

Tbn. 1 *mp*

B. Tbn. *mp*

Tba. *mp*

Tim. *p*

B. D. *mp*

Tri. *p*

O

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Ch.

p p p

Q

6. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling

System des transzendentalen Idealismus

[1800]

6. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling: System des transcendentalen Idealismus [1800]

The sixth section explores the text 'System of Transcendental Idealism' written by Schelling in 1800.

Introduction

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854) originated from the Duchy of Württemberg where he knew Hölderlin as a child and as a student at a Lutheran seminary.

In 1798, at the age of 23, having met and impressed Goethe with his ideas about how to unify scientific and philosophical thought, he was appointed to the University of Jena in the Duchy of Saxe-Weimar as a professor of Philosophy.

Schelling joined Hölderlin and others in refuting the subjective metaphysics of Fichte and investigating a detailed postulation of Absolute Idealism.

Schelling also immersed himself in the intellectual fervour of Early Romanticism and became familiar with Caroline Schlegel, whose house in Jena was a gathering place for many of the young literary and intellectual elite. After tragedy struck and Caroline's fifteen-year-old daughter died of dysentery, she and Schelling grew close. Their time in the dukedom came to an end in 1803 after Caroline agreed to separate from August Schlegel (the brother of Friedrich) and to marry Schelling, and the couple were pressed into exile.

Theory

Schelling's Naturphilosophie challenged the status of epistemology as first philosophy by revealing its questionable pre-suppositions. Like others in Weimar, Schelling articulated the paradox present in Kant's transcendental idealism, which justifies itself by defining limits of knowledge that themselves prevent their own justification. He argued that there was a need to move into the realm of constitutive metaphysics to solve the dilemma. He argued in support of Absolute Idealism and its rejection of Critical Idealism by way of refuting the principle of self-consciousness as the starting point of philosophy.

Schelling asserted that Absolute Idealism, as represented in his own theory of Naturphilosophie, is the doctrine that all things are constituents of a single universal organism and thus conform to its inherent design, or ideal. It is a monist approach in that the only independent and self-sufficient entity is the universe itself, it is a vitalist approach in that this monism is organic and characterised by a process of growth and development, and it is a rationalist approach in that this development has purpose, conforming to archetypal ideals. Accordingly it can be said to be a synthesis of Spinozism, vitalism, and Platonism.

In his System of Transcendental Idealism, Schelling wrote that complementing Kant's transcendental theory with his own 'nature as objective' doctrine embodies three main assertions.

Firstly, that nature develops organically from whole to parts, whereby the development of the lower taxonomic tiers of life supervenes upon the higher levels and in turn upon the totality of life. Schelling argued that biological species should be seen as an archetypal ideal of themselves.

Secondly, Schelling argued that, although nature is purposefully organised, it's not a static mechanistic system. It involves processes of dynamic change. It's distinguished by a self-development that itself generates progressively more complex life. That's to say, plants and animals and all living things progress (i.e. evolve, although without the Darwinian notion of natural selection) from one generation to the next.

Thirdly, this process of organic development is teleological. Evolutionary development is oriented upon realising the archetypal ideals. In other words, biological organisms change over time according to the natural forces governing the whole of nature. If birds develop longer and stronger wings to fly higher and further, it's because the laws of nature are guiding their archetypal anatomy in this direction.

Schelling sought to justify his assertions by insisting that the fundamental question of all epistemology, pertaining to how concepts correspond to the world, must fully explain the interaction between the mental and physical, and between the real and the ideal. He said that a dualist Cartesian or Kantian approach makes correspondence and interaction impossible; it implies epiphenomenalism, and therefore doesn't provide a solution.

Schelling joined with Hölderlin and Novalis¹⁰ to argue that the very possibility of consciousness requires a higher ground that transcends it and that only a monist approach offers such a higher ground. He said that Naturphilosophie asserts a naturalistic epistemology by placing both the subject and objects of knowledge within nature as a whole. The subject's awareness of nature is not governed by necessary and transcendental laws of reason at all. Instead it is an expression of the power of nature. Both the mental and the physical are part of the natural world.

He asserted that nature is not a projection of consciousness but an autonomous reality with an absolute ontology and with an inherent rationality. Even the act of knowledge must be placed within nature as a whole. Schelling argued that the notion of subject-object identity does not apply only to self-consciousness but also to the single infinite substance of which the subjective and objective are attributes. The subject is determined through the objective and vice versa.

Schelling agreed with Kant that the task of philosophy is to explain the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge, whereby the subject can establish necessary truth through experience, and where the absolute can reach beyond itself to posit the empirical world. Schelling argued that theoretical reason itself cannot postulate any transition from the infinite to the finite given that the determinate cannot be derived from the indeterminate; this requires knowledge of the world. On the other hand, if subject-object identity is grounded by self-consciousness, or even by the faculty of intellectual intuition as argued by Fichte, then the subject can know nothing but itself. Solipsism is inevitable. This approach prevents it explaining knowledge of external objects. The solution, according to

¹⁰ Look online (English translations are available) for Novalis, 1799. *Hymnen an die Nacht*.

Schelling, is to view subject-object identity both as objective and also as the coherency of rationalism that in turn is an attribute of the absolute, so that it refers to the single universal substance that comprises both the subject and the object of ordinary experience. It is not pure self-consciousness, but self-knowledge of the absolute itself.

Indeed, Schelling refuted the notion that the all-encompassing characteristic of the absolute precludes any possibility of intellectual discourse about that characteristic, and that, akin to medieval theological arguments, it is not possible to say anything about the absolute given this would ascribe a property to it and posit difference. Schelling argued that this approach would limit theory to the justification only of tautologies. He proposed differentiating between the essence and form of absolute identity. The essence of the absolute is its nature considered in itself while its form is the manner of its being. Thus the tautology 'p=p' asserts only the complete identity of subject and object, but not the 'p' of the subject or the 'p' of the object.

Schelling argued that the essence of matter does not consist in physical extension as described by Copernican physics, but in motion. In this regard he was defending the science of the time, which articulated a more dynamic view of the physical world and no separation between the biology of life and the physics of astronomy. Schelling was also reiterating the views of Herder who first argued for natural vitalism and its combination with monism twenty years earlier, asserting that the mental and physical are different degrees of organisation and development of organic force. They are not distinct kinds of substance with some unknowable causal connection. Rather they are different systems of organisation governed by a single living force.

However, unlike his scientific colleagues, Schelling used *a priori* epistemics to justify natural vitalism. He argued that theoretical analysis must identify the first causes of nature, its inner activity, unlike empirical observation which identifies secondary causes. He insisted that Naturphilosophie must begin from *a priori* principles and construct all propositions from these, whereas empirical science begins from *a posteriori* principles and derives its principles accordingly. The fundamental principles of Naturphilosophie must be rational rather than experiential simply because the first causes of nature cannot be expressed in terms of experience itself. The central premise of Absolute Idealism is a metaphysical one because its principles precede any possible experience and cannot be derived from it.

Schelling added that Naturphilosophie ascribes a further attribute of rationality to nature, the assertion that nature acts in pursuit of objectives. It holds that nature is not purely mechanical but also organic, with a systematic structure developed from its own intelligent activity. Thus rationality is inherent in nature itself, implicit within its purposiveness and not imposed on it externally by subjective understanding.

Just as he rejected a strictly mechanistic conception of the laws of nature, so Schelling also refuted the conventional definitions of rationalism associated in particular with Leibniz and Wolff, which were oriented on geometric or axiomatic theorems. Instead he looked to the principle of purposiveness.

Schelling's account described teleology as an intrinsic force governing not only the mind, as Kant had proposed, but also nature. Given the rejection of mind-body dualism and the postulation of the identity of consciousness and nature, he argued that it is a simple deductive inference to the suggestion that the unity of mind and nature supervenes upon the self-organising characterisations of teleological rationality, characteristics that can only be interpreted as a form of intelligence or reason inherent in matter.

Accordingly Schelling argued that the ideal of the absolute is its essence, which is construed as the rational and intelligible structure of the archetypal. It is the purposive activity that governs the natural world.

Interestingly, Kant had also proposed a teleological force uniting mind and nature. However he had asserted that such a force could never be interpreted as real. Epistemic investigation could proceed only on the basis 'as if' there was such a law. It possessed only a conditional status and accordingly it was merely a regulative methodology and not a metaphysical truth. In contrast Schelling asserted it as a constitutive principle and concluded accordingly that consciousness is the realm where the absolute becomes self-conscious in the context of the finite world.

Schelling believed that the human mind had attained the highest degree of development within nature, and consequently the absolute reaches manifestation and its ultimate realisation only through it. Not only does Intellectual Intuition enable the subject to perceive the unity of universals and particulars, of the ideal and real, in a way that is characteristic of Platonic forms, but it reveals how self-consciousness has a history of development itself within consciousness.

Like Hölderlin before, Schelling argued further that teleology is perceived by the human subject in terms of aesthetic concepts. He said it's not something that can be identified objectively in itself either in the mental or natural worlds, however the faculty of aesthetic perception enables the subject to identify natural forces as analogous to the dynamic forces underpinning the human expression of art and, furthermore, to appreciate how beauty is analogous with the innate spirit of nature.

Indeed, Schelling approached the entire history of human civilization and culture as an equivalent to the development of nature, both of them as would-be dramas possessing purposeful orientation. He argued that, given the mind of both the individual and that of the community strive for resolution through art, the history of human development and progress is led by way of aesthetic consciousness, which finds its fulfilment in great art by way of its intrinsic teleology.

The artist, by attaining the capacity of genius, motivated by a primal creativity analogous to the universal creativity of the absolute, fuses all forces of opposition into the image of absolute harmony. Accordingly, the infinite expressed in finite terms is art and poetry, music and literature, all of them artificial products designed of human genius that reveal the absolute of mind and nature.

Influence

Schelling's philosophy was of great interest to many in Weimar because it offered a solution to the reconciliation of scientific and philosophical knowledge. His articulation of natural vitalism continued to impress Goethe, and it also made a great impression upon the visiting Prussian explorer and naturalist Alexander von Humboldt¹¹. However Schelling's greatest immediate legacy was his influence upon Hegel (see section 6), who took many aspects of Schelling's work as a starting point for his own version of Absolute Idealism.

In the ensuing decades, there was a tendency among subsequent generations of scientists to ridicule Schelling and those of his era for their tendency to place experimental findings in what could be described as a great sea of metaphysical speculation. Nevertheless University of Jena scientists such as Ernst Haeckel¹² and mathematicians such as Frege (see section 8) continued to sustain certain elements of idealism in their theoretical conceptions of science.

In the early twentieth century Schelling's 'Absolute Idealism' influenced Bertrand Russell's 'Neutral Monism',¹³ the notion that material reality and consciousness are not fundamental in themselves but two components of a single monist substance or reality. This theory has been further developed in the twenty-first century by David Chalmers¹⁴ and others.

Pedagogical Questions

1. What is the relationship between the mind and the body, and between consciousness and the physical world?
2. To what extent are evolutionary developments in nature determined by goals or objectives?
3. What is the link between human reason and natural reason?

Quotes

"Precisely because our whole knowledge is originally through and through empirical, it is through and through a priori. For were it not wholly our own production, our knowledge would either be all given to us from without, which is impossible, since if so there would be nothing necessary and universal in our knowledge; or there would be nothing left but to suppose that some of it comes to us from outside, while the rest emerges from ourselves. Hence our knowledge can only be empirical through and through in that it comes wholly and solely from ourselves, i.e. is through and through a priori." (Schelling 152)

¹¹ See Humboldt, Alexander Von, 1845-1862. *Cosmos: A Sketch or a Physical Description of the Universe*, trans. E.C. Otte. CreateSpace, 2014.

¹² Haeckel is normally touted as an extreme anti-idealist, but his physicalist idealism is evident in Haeckel, Ernst, 1892. *Monism as Connecting Religion and Science*, trans. J. Gilchrist. London, A. and C. Black, 1895.

¹³ See Russell, Bertrand. *The Analysis of Mind*. London, G. Allen & Unwin, 1921.

¹⁴ His first full volume is highly recommended. See Chalmers, David. *The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory*. Oxford University Press, 1996.

"In Fichte's system identity constitutes itself only as subjective Subject-Object. [But] this subjective Subject-Object needs an objective Subject-Object to complete it, so that the Absolute presents itself in each of the two Subject-Objects, and finds itself perfected only in both together as the highest synthesis that nullifies both insofar as they are opposed."
(Hegel 155)

Hegel, G. W. F. *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, trans. Harris and Cerf. State University of New York, 1977.

Schelling, F. W. J. *System of Transcendental Idealism* [System des transcendentalen Idealismus] 1800, trans. Peter Heath. Charlottesville, The University Press of Virginia, 1978.

Introduction to the music

The percussion and brass outline the rhythms (identity thesis) of vitalism. The strings soar with a melody (freely intuited) on the wings of *telos*. The textures reveal music of the archetypal ideal.

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling: System des transcendentalen Idealismus [1800]

Philip Armstrong

Allegro $\text{♩} = 124$ [Enter dancers. Children of a new age of liberty and discourse dance around Eurydice to celebrate a heritage of music, art, literature and philosophy.]

A The rhythms (identity thesis) of vitalism

Piccolo

Flute 1

Flute 2

Oboe

Cor Anglais

Clarinet 1

Clarinet 2

Bass Clarinet in Bb

Bassoon

Contrabassoon

Horn 1

Horn 2

Horn 3

Trumpet 1

Trumpet 2

Trumpet 3

Trombone

Bass Trombone

Tuba

Timpani

Tenor Drum

Bass Drum

Snare Drum

Triangle

Violin I

Violin II

Viola

Violoncello

Contrabass

1: F, 2: C, 3: A, 4: G

Allegro $\text{♩} = 124$ [Enter dancers. Children of a new age of liberty and discourse dance around Eurydice to celebrate a heritage of music, art, literature and philosophy.]

A The rhythms (identity thesis) of vitalism

B

19

Picc.

Fl. 1

Fl. 2

Ob.

C. A.

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn.

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn.

B. Tbn.

Tbn.

T. D.

S. D.

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Cb.

B

33

C

Picc.

Fl. 1

Fl. 2

Ob.

C. A.

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn.

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn.

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp.

T. D.

B. D.

S. D.

Hi-Hat.

Ped. B. D.

D

C

D

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vcl.

Ch.

47

E **F**

Picc. *f* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Fl. 1 *f* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Fl. 2 *f* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Ob. *f* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

C. A. *f* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Cl. 1 *f* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Cl. 2 *f* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

B. Cl. *f* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Bsn. *f* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Cbsn. *f* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1 *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Tpt. 2 *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Tpt. 3 *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Tbn. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

B. Tbn.

Tbn.

Timpani *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

T. D. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

S. D. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Hi-Hat. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Tri. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Ped. B. D. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

E **F**

Vln. I *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Vln. II *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Vla. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Vc. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Cb. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

G Melody (freely intuited) on the wings of *telos*

H

6/

Picc. *p mp mf p*

Fl. 1 *p mf p mp mf p*

Fl. 2 *p mf p mp mf p*

Ob. *p mf p mp mf p*

C. A. *p mf p mp mf p*

Cl. 1 *p mf p mp mf p*

Cl. 2 *p mf p mp mf p*

B. Cl. *p mf p mp mf p*

Bsn. *mf*

Cbsn. *mf*

Hn. 1 *p mp mf p*

Hn. 2 *p mp mf p*

Hn. 3 *mf*

Tpt. 1 *f*

Tpt. 2 *f*

Tpt. 3 *f*

Tbn. *f*

B. Tbn. *f*

Tba. *mf*

T. D. *p f p f p f*

Cym. (sizzle cymbal) *p*

Tri. *mp*

Ped. B. D. *p*

G Melody (freely intuited) on the wings of *telos*

H

Vln. I *p mp mf p*

Vln. II *mf p mp mf p*

Vla. *p mf p mp mf p*

Vc. *p mf p mp mf p*

Cb. *mf*

div. *f*

unis. *mf p mf*

div. *f*

unis. *mf p mf*

I

90

Picc. *f*

Fl. 1 *f*

Fl. 2 *f*

Ob. *f*

C. A. *f*

Cl. 1 *f*

Cl. 2 *f*

B. Cl. *f* *p*

Bsn. *f* *p*

Cbsn. *p*

Hn. 1 *p*

Hn. 2 *p*

Hn. 3 *p*

Tpt. 1 *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Tpt. 2 *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Tpt. 3 *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Tbn. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

B. Tbn. *f* *p*

Tba. *p*

Timp. *f* *p* *f* *p*

T. D. *p* *mp* *p* *mf* *p* *f*

S. D. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Hi-Hat. *p*

Ped. B. D. *f* *p*

I

Vln. I *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f*

Vln. II *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *div.*

Vla. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Vc. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Cb. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

K Music of the archetypal ideal

1/8

Picc. *p*

Fl. 1 *p*

Fl. 2 *p*

Ob. *p*

C. A. *p*

Cl. 1 *p*

Cl. 2 *p*

B. Cl. *mf*

Bsn. *mf*

Cbsn. *mf*

Hn. 1 *mf*

Hn. 2 *mf*

Hn. 3 *mf*

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn.

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *mp*

B. D. *mf*

Ti. *mp*

K Music of the archetypal ideal

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla. *mf* *div.*



Vc. *mf* *div.*


Cb. *mf*

div.


[N] [Exit dancers.]


143

Timp. 
 B. D. 
 Trp. 
 Vln. I 
 Vln. II 
 Vla. 
 Vc. 
 Cb. 

[N] [Exit dancers.]
 Vln. I 
 Vln. II 
 Vla. 
 Vc. 
 Cb. 

=

Fl. 1 
 Fl. 2 
 B. D. 
 Trp. 
 Vln. I 
 Vln. II 
 Vla. 
 Vc. 
 Cb. 

Fl. 1 
 Fl. 2 
 B. D. 
 Trp. 
 Vln. I 
 Vln. II 
 Vla. 
 Vc. 
 Cb. 

7. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

**Phänomenologie des Geistes
[1807]**

7. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Phänomenologie des Geistes [1806]

The seventh section explores the text 'The Phenomenology of Mind' written by Hegel in 1806.

Introduction

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 – 1831) enrolled at the Tübinger Stift in Württemberg at the age of eighteen and shared a room with Hölderlin and Schelling. Together they discussed their common interests in Hellenic culture, Kantian philosophy, and the French Revolution.

Schelling encouraged Hegel to move to the Duchy of Weimar in 1801 and to take a starting position of unsalaried lecturer at the University of Jena. Thereafter they gave lectures and published a philosophical journal together, exploring the theory of Absolute Idealism, its roots in the ancient past, its solutions to the problems of transcendentalism, and its meaning for politics.

Hegel worked in greater isolation after Schelling left the area. He set about trying to articulate his own philosophical position. There were still some last sections to be added to his definitive volume when Napoleonic forces engaged Prussian troops at the Battle of Jena–Auerstedt on the hills between the towns of Weimar and Jena on 14 October 1806 and when, following the slaughter or wounding of ten thousand men in the name of freedom, Hegel watched Napoleon make his triumphant entry into Jena on horseback.

After the eventual publication of the Phenomenology of Mind in 1807, and after many students had fled Jena and its university in the wake of war, making it impossible for Hegel to secure an income, he was forced to leave the town in search of employment elsewhere. After working as a High School Director in Nuremberg for eight years, he was appointed professor of Philosophy at the University of Berlin, a position that had become vacant at Fichte's death and which Hegel occupied until his death in a cholera epidemic in 1831.

Theory

It was his reading as a young man (with Schelling and Hölderlin) of Plato and Aristotle that convinced Hegel that the greatest human virtue lies in excellence. It is this that they should aspire towards, for it is something greater than mere political emancipation, something that requires the self be a balanced whole attuned to nature, a harmony of reason and passion.

In particular Hegel was impressed by Aristotle's premise that the world is a form of organism, whereby the whole attends to the parts and vice versa, a single indivisible living being, not at all an entity characterised by the Cartesian divisions of mind and body. This unity should be the starting point of all philosophical theory.

By the time he wrote the Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel's views had matured significantly, but he held to these maxims. He appreciated the claim that scepticism and nihilism are the inevitable result of an epistemology that, arguing the faculty of knowledge exists prior to its own application, cannot know any object in-itself. Hegel had further come to the belief that Schelling's Absolute Idealism

offered no real solution to the dilemma. While Schelling had argued that knowledge of the Absolute and of reality-in-itself is necessary to be able to abstract from the subjective, he had never explained how such a thing might be possible.

Hegel accepted Schelling's premise that the subject and object of experience are unified by way of thought. However he countered that this unity is not necessarily transparent to mind. He argued that philosophical analysis of these forms of experience is required to reveal the underlying principle of unity. Hegel argued that it is the object of philosophy itself which must be characterised as the Absolute.

Hegel's exegesis of Absolute Idealism in the 'Phenomenology' posited that the dispute between subjectivism and objectivism is actually misconceived. Absolute Idealism pertains to neither the subject nor the object. Instead it represents the structure that defines both. It is not possible to reduce subject to object and vice versa. It is a necessary condition for the self-realisation of the Absolute that it divides itself into subject and object. Yet this opposition doesn't diminish identity. It is absolute, and accordingly it can be both subject and object.

Hegel asserted that all things are not grounded in themselves but only in the universal divine ideal, a contention attributable to Platonist doctrine. While Schelling had described the objective in terms of the naturalistic and biological, Hegel viewed it as Absolute Mind, a kind of spirit, the self-consciousness of life that becomes manifest in the development of society, state and history. Hegel viewed the realm of Mind as higher than that of nature. Nature should be considered as only an externalist feature of the Absolute whereas Mind is both internal to the human subject and a representation of the highest organisation of the Absolute.

Hegel further asserted that the Absolute is the union of universality and particularity, or dissimilarity. It is a fusion that transcends the respective extremes and that simultaneously reveals the Absolute in its ultimate form. Thereafter he sought to resolve the paradox that beleaguered the Weimar Identity Thesis, the assertion that there can be no distinction made between epistemics pertaining to knowledge of the Absolute, and ontology pertaining to the extant entity that is the Absolute-in-itself. The thesis implies that if the Absolute is all, then knowledge of the Absolute is equivalent to self-knowledge of the Absolute, and that if subject-object identity is a necessary condition of knowledge, then the human subject who knows the Absolute must actually be identical with the Absolute. Hegel pointed out that this in turn implies it is not the individual subject knowing the Absolute; only the Absolute can know the Absolute! And yet the finite subject cannot know the Absolute because it would no longer be of the Absolute.

Hegel became convinced it is necessary to make negativity an essential element of the Absolute. He argued that the problem lay in Kant's principle of transcendental apperception, which had been the first articulation of subject-object identity, because of its subjective status and the ensuing implication of solipsism, whereby the subject knows only the context of its own mind. Kant's transcendental subject knows only what it creates and is thus caught in a circle of its own consciousness.

Hegel sought to find a new explanation of the distinction between the subject and object of ordinary experience. He argued that if the object is given, and produces representations dependent on nothing more substantive than the imagination, then philosophy should not rest with merely dismissing this appearance as illusion; it should explain its necessity. He argued that an explanation can be found by characterising the Absolute as the identity of identity and non-identity. The single universal substance in which subject and object are identical divides and produces the distinction between subject-object identity and subject-object non-identity.

Hegel's refutation of the circle of consciousness thus establishes the equal and independent reality of the other. He argued that self-knowledge is characterised by subject-object identity in the sense that the subject and object of knowledge are the same, but also by subject-object non-identity in the sense that the object is given to the subject and appears independent of the subject's will and imagination.

In the second chapter of the 'Phenomenology', Hegel addressed the implication of negativity for ontology. He abandoned the notion of intellectual intuition, which he had originally shared with Schelling and the other Absolute idealists. Instead he sought a justification for subject-object identity by way of metaphysics. Whereas Kant had approached metaphysics as a form of speculation that entailed *a priori* reasoning about objects beyond the sphere of experience, Hegel denied the transcendent nature of the noumenal. Instead he conceived the infinite and the unconditional as immanent, as something which exists not beyond the finite world but within it.

Hegel asserted that metaphysics is a necessary phenomenon underpinning experience and, in the fifth chapter of the 'Phenomenology', he sought to explore the implications of this as regards the laws of reason and organic teleology. Hegel argued that, given the Absolute is taken to be the totality of all reality, it follows that there is a multiplicity of universals within it organised as a coherent whole. This ontological structure is itself the determinant of the strict rationalism of logic, which in turn reveals the pure universal principles that define both the Absolute as a whole and its corresponding comprehensible structure. Furthermore this structure is the basis of reality, which is the identity of the material realm and the system of concepts that establishes the essence of everything that exists. Hegel argued that it is the function of reason, as determined by the Absolute, to reveal the entirety of finitude in an organized and intelligible form.

In this context, Hegel argued that idealist doctrine must also address the self-reflexivity of reason. If the laws of reason are taken as the grounding of rationalism then they are subject to themselves, which potentially creates a circular argument lacking foundations. Accordingly idealist theory must seek to resolve the issue, to overcome the arguments of the anti-foundationalists while also circumventing the arguments of those who previously criticised Enlightenment values as nihilist.

Hegel said these considerations are overcome if reason is itself grounded by the rationality of metaphysics. He argued that Kant and Jacobi¹⁵ were wrong to characterise reason by way of a mechanical paradigm of explanation, something akin to causality that justifies events merely in

¹⁵ For the original German version see Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich, 1785. *Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn*. Breslau: Gottlieb Löwe.

terms of their prior determinants. He said they failed to acknowledge that reason also has the power to explain the presence of an entire series of causes, and to grasp the reason for which it exists in the first place. The inner logic of understanding demands that the subject perceive the cause and effect, the condition and the unconditioned, as parts of a single indivisible whole. Unity is all!

Hegel argued that Absolute Idealism must look to the very nature of conceptual development for an explanation of reason. This development reveals itself not in terms of temporality and the passage of time but in terms of the very rationality underpinning concepts. Hegel posited that philosophical concepts are not dependent on the empirical perception of causality, on perception and *a posteriori* knowledge. However neither are they abstract universals in a fixed *a priori* structure that allows for their independence from other universals. Concepts are underpinned by an ultimate principle governing thought that determines both perception and abstract reflection. Thought possesses the organic unity of both universality and particularity. Each possesses a single identity in terms of its dissimilarity with other concepts, yet each of them links with all others to form a metaphysical structure which comprises a self-sufficient construction of concepts.

Hegel recognised the need to justify reason as the foundation of morality and religion in a way that could overcome, on the one hand, Hume's critique of causation and, on the other hand, the necessitarianism of Spinoza's axiomatisation, or Kant's transcendentalism, or a Leibnizian-Wolffian dogmatism with its adherence to the principle of sufficient reason¹⁶. However this is not possible if reason and logic are themselves not foundational. Hegel argued that reason and logic are foundational constructions formed in turn by a grounding that is in turn answerable to a principle of sufficient grounding, which in turn enables the causal transition of any one thing to becoming another.

Accordingly, Hegel refuted the notion of explaining knowledge merely in terms of prior causes. He rejected out of hand Kant's transcendental epistemology with its simplistic application of *a priori* rationality to evaluate claims to knowledge, and he rejected Schelling's Naturphilosophie because of its even more simplistic mechanist application of *a priori* representations to phenomenon. Hegel argued that rulebooks and method must be the result of a metaphysical inquiry and not the starting point.

Hegel argued further that any philosophical explanation of reason, as determined by the metaphysical structure of the Absolute, must encompass the ultimate state and manifestation of Absolute Mind, its final goal. He argued for a revisiting of Aristotle's notion of finality and completeness, and of the notion of the highest good embedded in the Unity of Life, an innate feature of the world that favours wholeness and harmony, and that opposes division and alienation.

In concordance with Hölderlin and Schelling, Hegel believed that the classical ideal of the highest good was compatible with a Romantic credo that valued self-realisation and excellence. It was not the ideological deduction of Kant's deontology with its callous refutation of sensibility. And it was not the trivial game-plan of utilitarianism with its focus upon viewing humans as passive consumers

¹⁶ This and a lot more at Leibniz, G.W. *Philosophical Writings*, trans. Morris & Parkinson. London: Dent (Everyman's Library), 1973.

of pleasure. Absolute Idealism asserted that self-realisation can be expressed aesthetically, like a novel or a symphony, exclusive and innovative, founded upon individual potential.

Hegel, like all the Romantics of his era, was a humanist. He argued against the Augustinian view of the world oriented upon demise, disease, distress, devastation and death, and of life as a rite of passage out of despair and towards a supreme destination. Hegel viewed the Christian doctrine of salvation merely as a forlorn cry of desperation associated with a loss of community and a disconnection with the natural world. He asserted the Aristotelian premise that the highest good can be found as innate to the world, not exclusively in some supernatural realm beyond the world.

Indeed, Hegel claimed that Aristotle had been the original founder of Absolute Idealism when he argued, contrary to Plato, that universals do not exist in isolation but only when realised in particulars. The universal exists in the final form of a thing, whereby it has a teleological meaning. As Aristotle had once postulated in his 'Metaphysics', the intrinsic *telos* of an acorn is to become a fully grown oak tree, and that of a child is to become an adult.

Hegel extended the principle of teleology to explain how the metaphysical structure of the Absolute possessed an innate rationality based upon achieving final ends. He proposed the notion of the dialectic as a process for the self-organising of subject matter, its inner necessity and inherent movement. He empathised again it is not an *a priori* methodology of knowledge accrual, or any kind of logic. It is metaphysical. The dialectic is innate within the inner movement of matter, the intrinsic notion of its development, rather than something applied externally or defined arbitrarily by philosophical theory. This inner movement is not a form of logic or reason left isolated and answerable to itself alone; it exists within the general category of being.

Hegel characterised the dialectic process as the ongoing development of concepts, which in turn is characterised by movement from a state of abstract potentiality to one of concrete actuality. The status of each concept determines an appropriate process of movement oriented towards the overall unity of the whole, a process which can also be characterised as the concept gradually moving towards a state of consciousness of itself.

Hegel posited there are three stages to dialectic synthesis. Firstly there is the moment of abstraction. The understanding postulates something objective as an object-in-itself, as if independent and self-sufficient. It makes a metaphysical claim that something exists in itself as separate and apart from other things. Secondly there is the moment of dialectic or 'negative' rationality. Understanding examines the object and realises it is not a self-sufficient entity at all but only comprehensible through its relation to other things. The stage is dialectic by nature because understanding is caught in contradiction. The concept of the object is seen as self-sufficient yet it requires an additional status of interrelation with the whole. It is both finite and infinite, independent and dependent. Thirdly there is the moment of speculative or 'positive' rationality. At this stage understanding resolves the contradiction by determining that which is objective is not the one thing alone, but the unity of that one thing with all other things. The understanding overcomes the contradiction at hand by moving to a higher level of comprehension. Hegel argued this dialectic process is ongoing in all intellectual thought, determined to continue until communal mind attains the level of the Absolute which ultimately includes everything within itself.

Hegel concluded that all things in the world are defined by ultimate purpose. Whatever happens does so of necessity, not just in the sense of prior causes but in order to fulfil the rational structure of the Absolute by realising some specific end. If the subjective subject-object finds reason and purpose in its subjective creativity, then the objective subject-object locates this reason in the Absolute by way of its orientation on a final state.

Hegel argued the ongoing development of concepts by way of dialectic synthesis solves paradoxes by showing how contradictory predicates are simultaneously true pertaining to different aspects of the same thing. He argued further that this principle implies a refutation of the law of non-contradiction whereby reality in itself must have one property and not its opposite. Dialecticism refutes the logic of no single thing being both true and false at the same time.

Hegel also applied the principle of metaphysical rationality to the development of philosophic theory itself. He argued that the philosophical heritage reaching back through Leibniz and Spinoza to Plato and Socrates and beyond involves something other than a random progression of theories following one after the other in time. Instead Hegel formulated a philosophical elucidation of the history of philosophical hypothesizing that itself is determined by dialectical reasoning. Accordingly his own Absolute Idealism is to be regarded as the synthesis and the end-point of all philosophical theorising that has come before.

Hegel asserted that it is this end-point that itself enables a rejection of the Kantian dualism of the noumenal and phenomenal. He said the dialectic encompasses them both as necessary parts of a single indivisible whole. The noumenal exists within the phenomena, the unconditional within the conditional. Indeed, the dialectic presents reason not just as a form of mechanical explanation intended to show the dependence of finite things upon each other, but as a broader form of holistic explanation. All things find their existence as part of the wider whole.

Furthermore the process of dialectic synthesis also provides a final-state solution to the paradox raised by Kant, Jacobi and others concerning the subject matter of metaphysics itself. They had argued that if ontology is, on the one hand, defined by a whole which is infinite, unconditional and indivisible, but on the other hand defined by concepts which are finite, conditioned and divisible, then it seems that understanding must annihilate any object in the very act of conceiving it. But now Hegelian dialectics had been able to re-interpret the nature of self-sufficiency in terms of a whole in which all connected terms are only parts. The ascent to the whole comes from within understanding itself, deriving from its inherent activity.

And there was still more. Not only are logic and philosophy determined by dialectic rationality, Hegel maintained that the same principle holds for the historical development of human civilisation. As had been argued by Schiller, Schelling and Hölderlin before, the world is a whole that is vitalist and organic by nature. The Absolute develops in the same manner as living things. But now Hegel was able to describe what this means in terms of rationality. Society begins in unity, differentiates into function, and returns to itself by reintegrating function into the whole. In this manner dialectics permeates logic, ethics, politics, and aesthetics.

Hegel said that any individual human subject, in the process of striving for autonomy and freedom, must acknowledge the diversity of world views, including cultural and national identities. And in doing so the individual must confront the goal-driven nature of the aggregate of these assorted world-views and how it is oriented towards an end-point in the historical continuum.

Hegel refuted the prevailing historicism that had led Herder into relativism. In contrast he asserted that all historical development is dialectic with the same corresponding three stages: emergent unity, differentiation, and reintegration or unity-in-difference. Accordingly history is a qualitative notion of progress that is underpinned by metaphysics. Accordingly struggle and conflict are necessary for spiritual development. Nothing is won or lost for nothing.

Hegel concurred with the prevailing view of his time that the values of the Enlightenment with its emphasis upon moral reason had finally fallen in the wake of the French Revolution, after political emancipation had led not to a rational constitution defending human right but to chaos and death. If Kant had argued that morality and duty were driven by reason, then post-Enlightenment historicism argued instead that humans are motivated rather by custom, imagination and gut-desire. Hegel took these arguments further by positing that the self-interests of the most powerful figures in history, those such as Caesar, Martin Luther, and now Napoleon, are nothing but the cunning of reason seeking to realise its ends. Hegel said any strong political leader must inevitably crush many innocents underfoot, destroying all that lies in the way. However from the chaos of private interests the order of purpose emerges.

Hegel concluded that reason as manifest in the world governs events with providence, by way of a divine plan. Hegel did not claim the existence of a supernatural realm lying at the end of dialectic synthesis, in the mode of revealed religion, but that redemption is achieved by way of history itself. However he did not balk from placing evil, injustice and suffering within the realm of rationality. He argued that these matters are a regrettable yet essential stage towards dialectic synthesis and self-awareness of freedom. Christian notions of evil represent the essence of 'negativity', the inner division of spirit, which in turn is a necessary stage in the self-realisation of spirit, and which in turn reveals the necessity of Absolute Mind.

In the seventh chapter of the 'Phenomenology', Hegel moved to look closer at both religion and art. He argued that if the constitutive existence of subject-object identity, as represented by human culture, is a form of Absolute Mind, or Absolute Spirit, which in turn is oriented on an ultimate status of perfection, then this perfection can only be understood in terms of abstract thought. However there are earlier stages in the hierarchy of Mind in which the Absolute is more readily comprehensible to self-consciousness. These can be found in the realm of aesthetics and art, which are able to reveal the objective by way of a subjective perspective upon beauty.

Hegel argued that if philosophy knows the Absolute through the medium of concepts, then religion and art know the Absolute through the medium of feeling and intuition, which are readily accessible to ordinary sense perception. However if art is the first medium in which the self comes to awareness of the Absolute, then philosophy is the end-state. Art is merely a thesis in the structure of Absolute rationality that will inevitably be surpassed by something greater, by a synthesis that

encompasses the abstractions of philosophical thought, and in particular of Hegel's philosophical thought.

Hegel said that Schelling, Schlegel and Hölderlin had considered art a higher form of intellect only because they had been unable to comprehend the dialectical form of reason. They had been wrong! Art has no future. It is as dead as those ten thousand soldiers on the Saxe-Weimar battle field. Only the Absolute as conceived by philosophy can remain.

Influence

Many philosophers reacted strongly against the all-pervasive system of Hegelianism, including Hegel's immediate successors such as Schopenhauer,¹⁷ Kierkegaard,¹⁸ Nietzsche (see section 7), and even the Young Hegelians. This antagonism continued into the twentieth century. Existentialism argued that existence is absurd and there is no grand purpose to life, thus refuting Hegel's assertions that life has intrinsic value, and that each person can find meaning by way of participating in earth's struggles. The analytic philosophy of Moore and Russell treated Hegelian dialectics as something in the region of the indescribably ludicrous.

However there have been many others who have looked to Hegel for inspiration. Hegel's refutation of classical logic was further developed by Leo Brouwer and other intuitionist mathematicians. Hegel's dialectic inspired philosophical interpretations of Marxism, Gadamer's Hermeneutics, and Derrida's Deconstruction. Hegel's metaphysical system, encompassing the role of 'negative' antithesis, unsurprisingly went on to inspire a non-metaphysical approach to Hegelianism.

Pedagogical Questions

1. How should we respond to philosophical views (such as those of Hegel and Luther) that describe evil (i.e. Buchenwald) as inevitable, and thus that renounce any responsibility to combat it, convinced of its providential necessity?
2. If everything happens as a result of a previous cause, or some external influence, then to what extent are humans free to act according to their own volition?
3. To what degree must spiritual freedom and political emancipation go hand-in-hand?
4. To what extent does rationality underpin either of (or both of) mind and nature?

Quotes

"This kingdom of laws is indeed the truth for understanding; and that truth finds its content in the distinction which lies in the law. At the same time, however, this kingdom of laws is only the preliminary truth and does not give all the fullness of the world of appearance. The law is present therein, but is not all the appearance present; under ever-varying circumstances the law has an ever-varying actual existence." (Hegel 85)

¹⁷ See Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1818. *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. E. F. J. Payne. New York, Dover, 2000.

¹⁸ See Kierkegaard, Søren, 1849. *The Sickness Unto Death*, trans. A Hannay. London, Penguin, 2008.

“Reason is the conscious certainty of being all reality. This is how Idealism expresses the principle of Reason. Just as consciousness assuming the form of reason immediately and inherently contains that certainty within it, in the same way idealism also directly proclaims and expresses that certainty. I am I in the sense that the I which is object for me is sole and only object, is all reality and all that is present.” (ibid 133)

“Organic existence is this absolutely fluid condition wherein determinateness, which would only put it in relation to an other, is dissolved. Inorganic things involve determinateness in their very essence; and on that account a thing realizes the completeness of the moments of the notion only along with another thing, and hence gets lost when it enters the dialectic movement. In the case of an organic being, on the other hand, all determinate characteristics, by means of which it is palpable to another, are held under the control of the simple organic unity; none of them comes forward as essential and capable of detaching itself from the rest and relating itself to an other being. What is organic, therefore, preserves itself in its very relation.” (ibid 147)

This last embodiment of spirit - spirit which at once gives its complete and true content the form of self, and thereby realizes its notion, and in doing so remains within its own notion - this is Absolute Knowledge. It is spirit knowing itself in the shape of spirit, it is knowledge which comprehends through notions. Truth is here not merely in itself absolutely identical with certainty; it has also the shape, the character of certainty of self; or in its existence - i.e. for spirit knowing it - it is in the form of knowledge of itself.” (ibid 469)

Hegel, G. W. F. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, [Phänomenologie des Geistes 1807] trans. J. B. Baillie. Mineola, NY, Dover Publications 2003.

Introduction to the music

The music is guided by a teleological wave that examines the contradictions in conflict as a necessary path to unity, in free will as a window to necessitarian causality, and ultimately in the law on non-contradiction itself.

Philip Armstrong

Moderato ♩ = 92 [Enter dancers: Angels of the dead take delight in the empyrean paradise; they clown with Orpheus.]

A Conflict as a necessary path to unity

Piccolo

Flute 1

Flute 2

Oboe 1

Cor Anglais

Clarinet 1

Clarinet 2

Bass Clarinet

Bassoon 1

Contrabassoon

Horn 1

Horn 2

Horn 3

Trumpet 1

Trumpet 2

Trumpet 3

Trombone 1

Bass Trombone

Tuba

Timpani

Timpani

Bass Drum

Cymbals

Harp

DCHB/E/F#GA♭

Moderato ♩ = 92 [Enter dancers: Angels of the dead take delight in the empyrean paradise; they clown with Orpheus.]

A Conflict as a necessary path to unity

teleological wave

TW

Violin I

Violin I

Violin II

Violin II

Viola

Violoncello

Violoncello

Contrabass

13

Picc. *p*

Fl. 1 *p*

Fl. 2 *p*

Ob. 1 *mf*

C. A.

Cl. 1 *pp*

Cl. 2 *p*

B. Cl. *pp* *f*

Bsn. 1 *p*

Chsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1 *mp* *p* *f*

Tpt. 2 *mp* *p* *f*

Tpt. 3 *mp* *p* *f*

Tbn. 1 *mp* *p* *f*

B. Tbn. *mp* *p* *f*

Tba. *mp*

1: Fz, 2: D, 3: C, 4: G

Timp. *mp*

Timp.

B. D.

Hhat *p* (Open)

S. Cym. *pp* *mp*

Hp. *p* *mp*

TW

Vln. I *dim poco a poco* *mf*

Vln. I *dim poco a poco* *mf*

Vln. II *dim poco a poco* *mf*

Vln. II *pizz.* *mp*

Vln. II *mp*

Vla. *pizz.* *mp*

Vc. *arco* *mp* *mp > pp*

Vc. *tap sounding board with fingers* *p*

Vc. *tap sounding board with fingers* *p*

Cb. *p*

Free will as a window to necessitarian causality

C

25

Picc. *p*

Fl. 1 *p*

Fl. 2 *p*

Ob. 1 *p*

C. A. *p*

Cl. 1 *p*

Cl. 2 *p*

B. Cl. *p*

Bsn. 1 *p*

Chsn. *p*

Hn. 1 *p*

Hn. 2 *p*

Hn. 3 *p*

Tpt. 1 *con sord.* *p*

Tpt. 2 *p*

Tpt. 3 *p*

Tbn. 1 *p*

B. Tbn. *p*

Tbu. *p*

Timp. *mp*

B. D. *p*

Hhat *p*

Hp. *p*

C

TW

Vln. I *p*

Vln. I *p*

Vln. II *p*

Vln. II *p*

Vla. *p*

Vc. *p*

Vc. *p*

Cb. *p*

D

37

Picc. *p*

Fl. 1 *p*

Fl. 2 *p*

Ob. 1 *p*

C. A. *mf* *p*

Cl. 1 *mp* *p*

Cl. 2 *mp* *p*

B. Cl. *p*

Bsn. 1 *mf* *p*

Chsn. *p*

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1 *mp* *p*

Tpt. 2 *con sord.* *mp* *p*

Tpt. 3 *con sord.* *mp* *p*

Tbn. 1 *p* *f*

B. Tbn. *p* *f*

Tbu. *p* *f*

Timp. *mp*

B. D. *p* *mf*

Hhat *p*

Hp. *p* *mp* *pp* *p*

D

TW. *mf* *mp* *p*

Vln. I *mf* *mp* *p*

Vln. I *mf* *mp* *p*

Vln. II *mf* *mp* *p*

Vln. II *mf* *mp* *p*

Vla. *pizz.* *arco* *mp* *p*

Vc. *mf* *p* *pizz.* *arco* *mf* *pp*

Vc. *mf* *p* *pizz.* *arco* *mf* *pp*

Cb. *mf* *p* *pizz.* *arco* *mf* *pp*

48 E

Picc. *p*

Fl. 1 *p*

Fl. 2 *p*

Ob. 1 *p*

C. A. *p*

Cl. 1 *mp* *p* *3*

Cl. 2 *mp* *p* *3*

B. Cl. *p*

Bsn. 1 *p*

Chsn. *p*

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1 *mp* *p* *f*

Tpt. 2 *mp* *p* *f*

Tpt. 3 *con sord.* *mp* *p* *f*

Tbn. 1 *p* *f*

B. Tbn. *p* *f*

Tbn. *p* *f*

Timp. *mp* *3*

B. D. *p* *mf*

Hhat *p*

Hr. *mp* *pp* *p* *mp* *pp*

TW E

Vln. I *mp*

Vln. I *mp*

Vln. II *mp* *p*

Vln. II *mp* *p*

Vla. *mp* *pizz.* *p* *arco* *pizz.* *p* *arco*

Vc. *mp* *pizz.* *mp* *p* *arco* *pizz.* *p* *arco*

Vc. *mp* *pizz.* *mp* *p* *arco* *pizz.* *p* *arco*

Cb. *pizz.* *pp*

60

Picc. *p*

Fl. 1 *p*

Fl. 2

Ob. 1 *p*

C. A.

Cl. 1 *p* *mp* *p*

Cl. 2 *p*

B. Cl. *p*

Bsn. 1 *p* *mf* *p*

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1 *p* *mp*

Tpt. 2 *p* *mp*

Tpt. 3 *p* *con sord.* *mp*

Tbn. 1

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp. *mp*

Hhat *p* *mf* *p*

Hp. *mp* *pp*

TW

Vln. I *p*

Vln. I *p*

Vln. II *p*

Vln. II *p*

Vla. *pizz.* *arco* *mp* *p*

Vc. *p* *mf* *p* *pizz.* *arco* *mp* *pp*

Vc. *mf* *p* *pizz.* *arco* *mp* *pp*

Cb. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *pizz.* *arco* *mp* *pp*

Philip Armstrong

G The law of non-contradiction

8/1

Picc. *p*

Fl. 1 *p*

Fl. 2 *p*

Ob. 1

C. A.

Cl. 1 *p*

Cl. 2 *p*

B. Cl. *p*

Bsn. 1

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1 *open* *mp* *open*

Tpt. 2 *mp* *open*

Tpt. 3 *mp*

Tbn. 1 *mp*

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp. *mp*

Hhat *p* *mf* *(Closed)* *p*

Hp. *pp* *mp* *pp*

G The law of non-contradiction

TW

Vln. I *mp*

Vln. I *mp*

Vln. II *mp*

Vln. II *mp*

Vla. *pizz.* *arco* *mp* *p*

Vc. *mf* *pp*

Vc. *mf* *pp*

Cb. *mf* *pp*

pizz. *arco* *p* *mf* *p*

[Exit dancers]

89

Picc.

Fl. 1

Fl. 2

Ob. 1

C. A.

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn. 1

Chsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn. 1

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp.

B. D.

TW

Vln. I

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Vc.

Cb.

[Exit dancers]

8. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche

**Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der
Musik [1872]**

8. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche: Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik [1872]

The eighth section explores the text 'The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music' written by Nietzsche in 1872.

Introduction

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844 – 1900) was raised in Naumburg, Saxony, about forty kilometres from Weimar.

He became professor of Classical Philology at the University of Basel in 1869. He had met Wagner for the first time a year earlier and thereafter attended the Bayreuth festival, but now he was invited to nearby Lucerne to visit the Wagner's home where he also became familiar with Liszt who visited frequently from Weimar. It was during this era of his life that Nietzsche published the first edition of his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy*, in 1872.

In 1879, after a significant decline in health, Nietzsche had to resign his position at Basel. However he had an independent income and was able to become a freelance philosopher traveling extensively around Europe for the ensuing ten years, including frequent visits characterised by familial conflict and compromise when returning to see his sister in Naumburg.

After many bouts of ill-health, Nietzsche suffered a mental breakdown in 1889 and was eventually brought back to the family house. When Nietzsche's sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, returned to Germany in 1893 from an extended period overseas she found Nietzsche suffering from a complete mental collapse. She took a leading role in supporting him domestically while also promoting his work. She moved to Weimar to do this in the context of the city's profound heritage and established the Nietzsche Archive on Humboldt Strasse in 1894. In 1897, after the death of his mother, Nietzsche was brought to Weimar by Elisabeth where she cared for him until his death.

Theory

Nietzsche rejected Hegel's historicism and its focus upon history as a tool for understanding the self. He argued that such an approach makes the subject a part of a mindless machine and undermines individual autonomy, the need to think for the self about purpose. He argued it is only possible for a subject to resolve questions of meaning by entirely abstracting the self from society and history.

In addition to his work in philology, Nietzsche had become passionate about the work of Schopenhauer¹⁹ and its pessimistic metaphysics. He sympathised with the view that the essence of the world is nothing but random flux, and that this in turn leads the human subject into endless torment without sense or purpose. Contrary to the dialectic *telos* of Aristotle and Hegel, he argued that life cannot be said to comprise any meaning whatsoever. Nietzsche joined Schopenhauer in characterising the nature of willing as perpetual agony, a ceaseless yearning without resolution. The

¹⁹ See Schopenhauer, A., 1818. *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. E. F. J. Payne. Dover, 2000.

primeval reality comprises a constant tumult of pain and anguish interrupted by sparse moments of pleasure, though with pain always prevailing.

Nietzsche was no stranger to suffering. He had served in the Prussian forces during the Franco-Prussian War as a horseman and medical orderly, and he had witnessed the traumatic scenes of battle. Furthermore he had suffered various forms of ill-health throughout his life. However, in the company of the Wagners in Lucerne, his opinion gradually shifted until, in an about turn and a strong refutation of Schopenhauer, his *Birth of Tragedy* asserted the possibility of a resolve to the pain and sorrow. Nietzsche said this is possible by way of a metaphysical union of forces that are both conflicting and yet also complementary, a union of the Dionysian and the Apollonian.

The contrast between these two forces had been addressed previously in the poetry of Hölderlin²⁰, but Nietzsche described the nature of the dichotomy in greater depth. The Dionysian represents the nature of reality, akin to Kant's noumenal realm, while the Apollonian represents the manner of its appearance, akin to the phenomenal realm. The Apollonian is a dreaming state, full of illusions, while the Dionysian is a state of inebriation, demonstrating the liberties of instinct and the overcoming of limitations.

As regards the ontological, the Dionysian is derived of the substance that is Schopenhauerian will. It is an entity of primitive darkness, menacing and intimidating. In contrast, the Apollonian is derived from Schopenhauer's representation of will. It is inauthentic, synthetic, counterfeit, mere appearance; it is the illusion of dreams.

As regards the epistemological, the Dionysian is revealed as inebriated truth, out of control, hideous and repulsive, leading to the total annihilation of knowledge itself. In contrast, the Apollonian is a trancelike glimpse upon those illusions, a naive grasp of superficiality.

Nietzsche's work in philology had made him familiar with the pre-Socratic age of ancient Greek civilisation. He knew that, if life in antiquity had comprised much pain and sorrow, still people had found purpose and meaning. Their lives and their greatest achievements were a part of a divine comedy staged in the context of Olympian pride and jealousy, acted out as mere amusement for the gods.

Nietzsche argued that, even though subject to such belittlement, the ancient Greeks, far from wallowing in self-remorse like Schopenhauer, embraced life with great devotion and dignity. The great heroes of Homer's time were proud to live and die to entertain the gods. The fact that the gods relished the spectacle of human suffering to such a high degree made these honourable heroes zealous to oblige.

Nietzsche argued that the eventual supplanting of the Homeric epic with tragic drama, the supplanting of individuation with an orientation upon the chorus, individuals immersing their distinctiveness in the whole, was another consequence of the spirit of Dionysus acknowledging without bitterness or remorse that actions are unable to affect change in the everlasting balance of

²⁰ See Hölderlin, 1800. *Brod und Wein*.

existence. The spectator of the drama is given the opportunity to sense an underlying essence, the Primordial Unity, which wakes the Dionysian nature. In this context, pessimism and fatalism are not only cowardly but futile. Given there is no release from the painful events of existence, the subject rejoices in the agony by ceasing to be a part of it. Any resort to a moral rationalisation of existence, such as that attempted by Schopenhauer, is taken as so misguided that it can only ever lead to even greater visualizations designed to escape otherwise unavoidable travails and grief.

Aristotle's Poetics had characterised tragedy as invoking catharsis, leading to emotional release and spiritual purification. Schopenhauer had written of using tragedy to expose the terrible truth of senseless striving. However Nietzsche moved beyond these psychosomatic premises. He wrote the Birth of Tragedy not as tragedy in itself but as meta-tragedy, an exposé of the tragedy of tragedy.

When the would-be hero seeks hopelessly to comprehend an unjust fate and then perishes without resolution, the suffering and tragedy allow the spectator to perceive the underlying essence of the drama, the very interchange between the Apollonian and Dionysian. Peering into the abyss of human sorrow portrayed by the characters on stage, the dichotomy acts to provide a medium for allowing the subject a closer contact with the nature of reality, the union that is the fusion of harmony, progress, clarity and logic with that of disorder, intoxication, emotion and ecstasy. It is in the profound comprehension of tragedy that it is possible to attain the deepest insight into the very scope of universal existence. The spectator is able to look out upon the world as if with the wisdom of the gods.

Nietzsche asserted that tragedy prompts a state of inebriation whereby the audience is able to perceive the metaphysical categories ordinarily applied to existence as illusory. The subject is no longer a submissive spectator but innate within existence. The audience perceives the sublime beauty represented by the Apollonian with the utter terror represented by the Dionysian. But there are also interactions between the two. Beauty and terror are combined as both the sorrow of life and the solace and comfort for it. The subject itself becomes an interrogation and provocation of the contingent nature of the world and its seemingly random acts of violence against humanity.

Nietzsche argued that, for a dramatist or for any artist, the fusion of Dionysian and Apollonian impulses is essential for any aesthetic realisation of truth. However this fusion has not been evident in society for over two millennia, since the ancient Greek tragedians and in particular the works of Aeschylus and Sophocles.

Aristotle had viewed Euripides, the youngest of the three great tragedians of antiquity, as the most evocative of catharsis. In contrast Nietzsche viewed him, the author of 'Iphigenia in Tauris' and the 'Bacchae', like many of his contemporaries as the opposite, as the agent of a decadent intellectualism that led to the rapid demise of tragic drama.

Nietzsche argued that Euripides destroyed Dionysian tragedy (long before Goethe's take on Enlightenment values did the same) because he came to emphasise the epistemics of mere knowledge above wisdom. This is evidenced by the relative unimportance of the chorus narratives and the emphasis upon characters who seek to settle matters merely by argument, or by would-be dialectic. In 'Iphigenia in Tauris' there are interminable debates about how to escape from the

tyranny and always the recourse to finding a solution is by way of reason and reasoning. The possibility of any spectator to the drama transcending the tragedy itself is lost.

Nietzsche argued Euripides was steered into this new direction by his friend and ally Socrates, he who knew everything, and who destroyed tragedy by seeking to establish reasoned argument as the justification for human behaviour and for theoretical explanations of the world.

Nietzsche argued it was Euripides' resource to rationalism, asserting an orientation upon reason-based morality, that denied tragedy of its true metaphysical basis, the delicate equilibrium between the Dionysian and Apollonian. Nietzsche asserted that the Socratic method of dialectic inquiry serves merely to negate life and to prohibit the act of uninhibited creation. He argued Socratic analyticity seeks to deny that sensory perception and intuitive insight alike possess any intrinsic value. This abstruse philosophising had succeeded only in casting the likes of Empedocles' Love and Strife into a very deep volcanic crater, refuting the experience of life in favour of transcendental ideals and leaving the modern world to inherit a bias towards reason at the cost of the artistic impulses of the Apollonian and Dionysus dichotomy.

Nietzsche argued that if Apollonian values govern alone, then the Dionysian will lack the integrity to enable meaningful art, and if the Dionysian governs alone, then the Apollonian will lack any sense of desire and aspiration. Only the interchange of these two forces brought together as art could achieve something akin to the metaphysical insight of early Greek tragedy. Yet this had itself become a dream, a part of the illusion created by rationalism. European civilisation from the time of Socrates to that of Laplace²¹ had been exclusively Apollonian and thus deeply corrupted.

But at last the Birth of Tragedy reveals the possibility of a true art that is itself conceived by way of the artist's representation of tragedy. Nietzsche believed, just as the forebears of antiquity had believed, that the more art addresses the agony of what art itself has to cope with, the more powerful it can become in overcoming the deep-seated agony of mortal existence.

Like Schiller and Hölderlin and other Weimar figures before, Nietzsche assigned a fundamental epistemic role to the faculty of aesthetics. If a human subject is going to perceive a resolve to the pain and anguish, then it will not be by way of any form of rational thought at all. He argued that it's only as aesthetic phenomenon that mental cognition provides the means to justify foundational matters of the world and the notion of being in general.

Nietzsche argued that it is aesthetics that reveals how the most profound revelation of meaning, where the Dionysian and Apollonian cross-fertilise and create a unity of expression, is to be found in the re-enactment of tragedy. However the telling of myth alone cannot achieve this. The profundity of aesthetics cannot be experienced by way of the sensual pleasure of epic poetry or sculpture alone, which merely offer delight in appearances; these experiences are illusory, grounded in sensory perception alone. Nietzsche argued that only music enables a subject to comprehend the profound nature of myth. Only when the listener can grasp the force of the Dionysian together with

²¹ For the full writings encompassing the entirety of the universe see Laplace, Pierre Simon, marquis de, 1798-1825. *Traité de mécanique Céleste*, trans. N. Bowditch. Boston, Hillard Gray Little & Wilkins, 1829-39.

its complementary Apollonian by way of great music is it possible to use the faculty of aesthetics to its full degree and thus perceive the meta-tragedy.

Only with music can the aesthetic reveal how tragedy harnesses and reins in the contingent. Only with music is the tiger caged and the tragedy made triumphant. Only with music can the subject confront the beast as if naked in their total vulnerability and surpass the feebleness and helplessness such that the sorrow of mortality is overcome. Only then can tragedy itself become eternal, emancipated of the contingent, a necessary being.

Nietzsche argued that the only art capable of rediscovering the spirit of tragedy and realising the Dionysian-Apollonian dichotomy is the music drama of Richard Wagner. It is only in Wagnerian music-drama, such as *Tristan and Isolde*, that the Apollonian-Dionysian dichotomy is truly accessible, the music making the tragedy not only bearable but seductive and desirable. When *Tristan* dies in Act Three, and he is made fully alive by the dark night of death, then there is transcendence above all the agonies of the world. His death serves as a conduit for all people to comprehend ecstatic pain in the same manner. He reasserts the truth of ancient Greek tragedy that the true heroes of art are the sacrificial victims who perish such that the world as a whole may attain redemption.

Influence

Nietzsche's work solicited both praise and hostility from his peers. *The Birth of Tragedy* eschewed the classical philological method in favour of a more speculative approach. Wagner admired it tremendously, but other philologists certainly didn't.

Nietzsche's focus on a balance of mental drives was taken up by many writers in other fields. Rudolf Steiner, after many years as editor of the Goethe archives in Weimar, identified the Apollonian and Dionysian with the spiritual development of humanity.²² Carl Jung wrote on the dichotomy in psychological types.²³ Michel Foucault argued that his 'Madness and Civilization' should be interpreted as a part of the great Nietzschean inquiry.²⁴

Nietzsche's subsequent works were used to defend right-wing militarism and were highly valued by Nazi Germany and Adolf Hitler, who frequently visited the Nietzsche archive in the city of Weimar, his main base until his eventual dismemberment of the Weimar Republic in 1933.

Nietzsche's work has also been important to postmodernism with its focus upon subjectivism, relativism, and anti-rationalism.

Pedagogical Questions

1. What is the role of rational intellectualism and emotional engagement in understanding purpose and meaning in life?

²² See Steiner, R, 1911. *The Spiritual Guidance of Man and Humanity* [Die geistige Führung des Menschen und der Menschheit], ed. Henry B. Monges. Anthroposophic Press, 1950.

²³ See Jung, C. G. & Baynes, H. G. *Psychological Types*. *Journal of Philosophy* 20 (23):636-640, 1923.

²⁴ See Foucault, M, 1961. *History of Madness* [Folie et Dérailson]. Routledge, 2006.

2. To what extent is aesthetic appreciation an objective or a subjective matter?
3. What is the relationship between psychology and art?

Quotes

“We shall have gained much for the science of aesthetics when we have succeeded in perceiving directly, and not only through logical reasoning, that art derives its continuous development from the duality of the Apolline and Dionysiac; just as the reproduction of species depends on the duality of the sexes, with its constant conflicts, and only periodically intervening reconciliations.” (Nietzsche 14)

“To the two gods of art, Apollo and Dionysus, we owe our recognition that in the Greek world there is a tremendous opposition, as regards both origins and aims, between the Apolline art of the sculptor and the non-visual, Dionysiac art of music. These two very different tendencies walk side by side, usually in violent opposition to one another, inciting one another to ever more powerful births, perpetuating the struggle of the opposition only apparently bridged by the word 'art'; until, finally, by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic 'will', the two seem to be coupled, and in this coupling they seem at last to beget the work of art that is as Dionysiac as it is Apolline - Attic tragedy.” (ibid 14)

Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1982. *The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music*, trans. Whiteside, ed. Tanner. London, Penguin 1993.

Introduction to the music

Pulses of sound evoke a transcendence of tragedy and suffering. Lilted patterns of sonancy conjure the reconciliation of dreams and illusion. The musical crests disclose the aesthetic revelation.

Friedrich Nietzsche: Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik [1872]

Philip Armstrong

Moderato $\text{♩} = 80$ A

This musical score is for the orchestral introduction of Friedrich Nietzsche's 'Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik' (1872). The tempo is marked 'Moderato' with a quarter note equal to 80 beats per minute. The score is divided into two systems, each marked with a boxed letter 'A'.

First System (Measures 1-16):

- Woodwinds:** Piccolo, Flute 1, Flute 2, Oboe, Cor Anglais, Clarinet 1 in Bb, Clarinet 2 in Bb, Bass Clarinet in Bb, Bassoon, and Contrabassoon. The Cor Anglais and Contrabassoon have melodic lines starting in measure 2, with dynamics *p* and *mf*.
- Brass:** Horn 1, Horn 2, Horn 3, Trumpet 1, Trumpet 2, Trumpet 3, Trombone, Bass Trombone, and Tuba. The Horns and Tuba have sustained notes in measures 15-16, marked *p*.
- Timpani:** Marked with '1: F#; 2: C; 3: G#'. It has a melodic line in measures 15-16, marked *p*.
- Bass Drum:** Starts in measure 1 with a *pp* pattern, then has a *mf > pp* section in measures 10-11.

Second System (Measures 17-24):

- Violins:** Violin I and Violin II. Both have melodic lines starting in measure 17, marked *p*. They include 'sul pont.' and 'gliss' markings.
- Viola:** Has a melodic line starting in measure 17, marked *p*.
- Violoncello and Contrabass:** Both have a continuous, rapid sixteenth-note pattern starting in measure 17, marked *p*.

The score concludes with a final measure (measure 24) featuring a *p* dynamic.

B Transcendence of tragedy and suffering

19

Picc. flutter *mp* *pp* *mp* *pp* *mp*

Fl. 1 *mp* *pp* *mp* *pp* *mp*

Fl. 2 *mp* *pp* *mp* *pp* *mp*

Ob.

C. A. *mf* *p*

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn. *mf* *p*

Cbsn. *mf* *p*

Hn. 1 *p*

Hn. 2 *p*

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1 con sord. *p* *mf* *p* *p* *mf* *p* *p*

Tpt. 2 con sord. *p* *mf* *p* *p* *mf* *p* *p*

Tpt. 3 con sord. *p* *mf* *p* *p* *mf* *p* *p*

Tbn. *p* *mf* *p* *p* *mf* *p* *p*

B. Tbn. *p* *mf* *p* *p* *mf* *p* *p*

Tbn.

Tim. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

Cym. *pp* *mf* *pp* *pp* *mf* *pp* *pp*

Cym. *pp* *mf* *pp* *pp* *mf* *pp* *pp*

Hp. DCB/Es/GA *p* *mf* *p*

B Transcendence of tragedy and suffering

Vln. I nat. *gliss.* *repeat freely* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Vln. I nat. *gliss.* *repeat freely* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Vln. II col legno *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Vln. II col legno *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Vla. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Vc. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Vc. harm. gliss. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Cb. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

C Reconciliation of dreams and illusion

25

Picc. *pp* *nat.* *pp*

Fl. 1 *pp* *nat.* *pp*

Fl. 2 *pp* *nat.* *pp*

Ob. *pp*

C. A. *pp*

Cl. 1 *pp*

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn. *pp*

Cbsn. *pp*

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1 *mf* *p*

Tpt. 2 *mf* *p*

Tpt. 3 *mf* *p*

Tbn. *mf* *p*

B. Tbn. *mf* *p*

Tbn. *mf* *p*

Timp. *mf*

Cym. *mf* *pp*

Cym. *mf* *pp*

S. D. *p* *ff*

Hp. *mf*

C Reconciliation of dreams and illusion

Gong

Gong

Vln. II *mf* *p* *arco (nat.)* *pp*

Vln. II *mf* *p* *arco (nat.)* *pp*

Vla. *mf* *p*

Vc. *mf* *p* *mp* *pp* *ff*

Vc. *mf* *p* *mp* *pp* *ff*

Cb. *mf* *f pp* *ff*

29

D

Picc. *pp*

Fl. 1 *pp*

Fl. 2 *pp*

Ob. *pp*

C. A. *pp*

Cl. 1 *pp*

Cl. 2 *pp*

B. Cl. *pp*

Bsn. *pp*

Cbsn. *pp*

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn. *p* $\rightarrow$ *ff*

B. Tbn. *p* $\rightarrow$ *ff*

Tbn. *p* $\rightarrow$ *ff*

Temp. *p* $\rightarrow$ *ff*

S. D. *p* $\rightarrow$ *ff*

D

Vln. I *pp*

Vln. I *pp*

Vln. II *pp*

Vln. II *p* $\rightarrow$ *ff*

Vla. *p* $\rightarrow$ *ff*

Vc. *f pp* $\rightarrow$ *ff*

Vc. *p* $\rightarrow$ *pp* $\rightarrow$ *ff*

Cb. *pp* $\rightarrow$ *ff*

E Aesthetic revelation

Picc.
 Fl. 1
 Fl. 2
 Ob.
 C. A.
 Cl. 1
 Cl. 2
 B. Cl.
 Bsn.
 Chsn.
 Hn. 1
 Hn. 2
 Hn. 3
 Tpt. 1
 Tpt. 2
 Tpt. 3
 Tbn.
 B. Tbn.
 Tbn.
 Timp.
 S. D.
 Vln. I
 Vln. I
 Vln. II
 Vln. II
 Vla.
 Vc.
 Vc.
 Cb.

Musical score for the section "E Aesthetic revelation". The score is written for a large orchestra and includes various instruments and dynamics. The key signature is one flat (B-flat). The time signature is 4/4. The score is divided into two systems, each with five staves. The first system includes Piccolo, Flutes 1 and 2, Oboe, Clarinet in A, Clarinets 1 and 2, Bass Clarinet, Bassoon, and Contrabass. The second system includes Horns 1, 2, and 3, Trumpets 1, 2, and 3, Trombones, Tuba, Timpani, Snare Drum, Violins I and II, Viola, Violoncello, and Contrabass. The score features a variety of musical notations, including notes, rests, and dynamic markings such as *mf*, *pp*, *p*, *ff*, *mp*, and *pizz.*. The section "E Aesthetic revelation" is marked with a box containing the letter "E".

F

Picc. *pp*

Fl. 1 *pp*

Fl. 2 *pp*

Ob. *pp*

C. A. *pp*

Cl. 1 *pp*

Cl. 2 *pp*

B. Cl. *pp*

Bsn. *pp*

Chsn. *pp*

Hn. 1 *p* con sord.

Hn. 2 *p* con sord.

Hn. 3 *p* con sord.

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn. *p* *ff*

B. Tbn. *p* *ff*

Tba. *p* *ff*

Timp. *p* *ff*

S. D. *p* *ff*

F

Vln. I *mf* *p*

Vln. I *mf* *p*

Vln. II *mp* *pp*

Vln. II *arco* *3* *gliss.* *ff* *pp*

Vla. *3* *pp* *mp* *pp*

Vc. *mp* *pp* *gliss.* *ff* *pp*


Vc. *mp* *pp* *ff* *pp*


Cb. *f* *pp* *ff* *pp* *ff*

45 G

Picc. 


Fl. 1 

Fl. 2 


Ob. 

C. A. 

Cl. 1 

Cl. 2 

B. Cl. 

Bsn. 


Chsn. 

Hn. 1 

Hn. 2 

Hn. 3 

Tpt. 1 

Tpt. 2 

Tpt. 3 

Tbn. 


B. Tbn. 


Tba. 

Temp. 

S. D. 

Vln. I 

Vln. I 

Vln. II 

Vln. II 

Vla.

Vc.

Vc.

Cb.

G

solo

H

53

Picc.

Fl. 1

Fl. 2

Ob.

C. A.

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn.

Chsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn.

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp.

B. D.

S. D.

H

Vln. I

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Vc.

Cb.

tutti (sul pont.)

sul pont.

sul pont.

sul pont.

This is a page from a musical score, labeled "58" in the top left corner. It contains staves for various instruments, including woodwinds, brass, percussion, and strings. The notation includes notes, rests, and dynamic markings like *mf*, *p*, and *pp*. There are also crescendo and decrescendo hairpins. The page ends with a double bar line and repeat dots.