

The Battle of Ideas

Der Kampf der Ideen

A pedagogical project/*Ein pädagogisches Projekt*
Prepared for the German National Theatre, Weimar/
Vorbereitet für das Deutsche National Theater Weimar
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Artwork: Otto Knille (1884)

The Battle of Ideas

Der Kampf der Ideen

The Introduction

The Weimar heritage is well known for its literary (i.e. Goethe, Schiller), musical (Bach, Hummel, Liszt, Strauss) and art (i.e. Cranach, Van der Velde, Bauhaus) traditions. It also has a significant philosophical tradition. Classical Weimar was home to the greatest flowering of philosophical thought since the classical era of ancient Athens (Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle) and included contributions from such figures as Herder, Schiller, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. It was this flowering that underpinned all the other achievements of the heritage including the literary achievements of Goethe and Schiller.

The tradition continued in the ensuing decades through the work of Frege and Carnap, revisiting issues that have been at the heart of philosophical analysis since the era of ancient Greece and that continue to be critical to intellectual inquiry today.

The Battle of Ideas celebrates the Weimar heritage by exploring several important philosophical treatise associated with the tradition. Furthermore it extends the Weimar heritage pertaining to idealism, language and semantics by seeking to express this tradition not only in terms of cognitive language but also, following the examples of Bach, Liszt and Strauss, in terms of music.

Das Weimarer Erbe ist bekannt für seine literarischen (z.B. Goethe, Schiller), musikalischen (Bach, Hummel, Liszt, Strauß) und künstlerischen (z.B. Cranach, Van der Velde, Bauhaus) Traditionen, aber auch für seine bedeutenden Philosophen. Mit Persönlichkeiten wie Herder, Schiller, Fichte, Schelling und Hegel beheimatete Weimar die Blüte des philosophischen Denkens seit der klassischen Ära im antiken Athen (Sokrates, Platon und Aristoteles), die alle anderen Errungenschaften, einschließlich der literarischen Leistungen von Goethe und Schiller, untermauerte.

Diese Tradition setzte sich in den folgenden Jahrzehnten durch die Arbeit von Frege und Carnap fort und griff Themen auf, die seit der Zeit des antiken Griechenlands im Zentrum der philosophischen Analyse stehen und die bis heute für die intellektuelle Forschung von Bedeutung sind.

Der Kampf der Ideen würdigt das Weimarer Erbe, indem er auf einige wichtige philosophische Schriften eingeht, die mit Weimars Tradition verbunden sind. Darüber hinaus wird das kulturelle Erbe Weimars in Bezug auf Idealismus, Sprache und Semantik erweitert in dem Versuch, die Tradition nicht durch kognitive Sprache, sondern nach den Beispielen von Bach, Liszt und Strauss durch Musik auszudrücken.

The Sections

The Battle of Ideas comprises of eleven sections which examine the following texts:

Der Kampf der Ideen besteht aus elf Abschnitten, die folgende Texte untersuchen:

1. Johann Gottfried Herder: Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit [1784] (English)
2. Friedrich Schiller: Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen [1794] (Letters upon the Aesthetic Education of Humanity)
3. Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre [1794/5] (Foundations of the Science of Knowledge)
4. Friedrich Hölderlin: Der Tod des Empedokles [1797-1800] (The Death of Empedocles)
5. Novalis: Hymnen an die Nacht [1800] (Hymns to the Night)
6. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling: System des transcendentalen Idealismus [1800] (System of Transcendental Idealism)
7. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Phänomenologie des Geistes [1806] (The Phenomenology of Mind)
8. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche: Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik [1872] (The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music)
9. Gottlob Frege: Über Sinn und Bedeutung [1892] (Sense and Significance)
10. Rudolf Carnap: Der logische Aufbau der Welt [1928] (The Logical Structure of the World)
11. Philip Armstrong: The Liszt Paradox / Das Liszt-Paradoxon [2018-19]

Each section comprises

- i. An introduction to the role of the author in the Weimar heritage,
- ii. A summary of the text's theoretical arguments,
- iii. A brief examination of the influence the work has had on others,
- iv. A list of outstanding pedagogical questions that can be used to drive further inquiry.

Each section also includes a piece of music that expresses the ideas associated with the text in terms of musical semantics.

Jeder Abschnitt umfasst:

- i. Eine Erläuterung der Bedeutung des Autors für das Weimarer Erbe,
- ii. Eine Zusammenfassung der theoretischen Argumentation des Textes,
- iii. Eine kurze Untersuchung des Einflusses dieser Arbeit auf andere,
- iv. Eine Liste offener pädagogischer Fragen, die zu weiterer Nachforschung anregen können.

Jeder Abschnitt enthält auch ein Musikstück, das die mit dem Text verbundenen Ideen musikalisch beschreibt.

Orchestra

1 piccolo
2 flutes
1 oboe
1 cor anglais (F)
2 clarinets (Bb)
1 bassoon
1 contra bassoon

3 horns (F)
3 trumpets (C)
1 tenor trombones
1 bass trombone
1 tuba

1 timpani (4)



2 percussion

- i. hand tambourine, large suspended cymbal, tenor drum, hand crash-cymbals, bass drum
- ii. snare drum, pedal hi-hat, metal wind chime, suspended tambourine, cowbells, small suspended cymbal (& contrabass bow), sizzle cymbal (chain sizzler), triangle, pedal bass drum

1 harp

strings

Duration: 50 minutes

All parts written in C except for standard octave transpositions.

1: Johann Gottfried Herder

**Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit
[1784]**

1: Johann Gottfried Herder: Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit [1784]

The first section explores the text 'Outline of a Philosophical History of Humanity' written by Herder in 1784.

Introduction

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) studied at the University of Königsberg where he was a student of Immanuel Kant. Thereafter he became a close acquaintance of the youthful Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, who was already an established author. Herder shared his ideas about Enlightenment values, the important role of literature and poetry in defining culture, and *Sturm und Drang* ideals.

Thereafter, following Goethe's appointment as a teacher and administrator at the Weimar Ducal Court in 1775, he used his influence to appoint Herder a year later to the role of General Superintendent to the Duchy of Saxe-Weimar, supervising ecclesiastical activities. The two men remained colleagues in Weimar and close friends until Herder's death almost thirty years later.

Theory

In his 'Outline', Herder insisted that the act of historical representation is not an impartial activity. He argued that historians cannot avoid bringing their own interests and agendas to their study of historical events; they judge historical eras of the past by way of their own values, not the values of the other historical era.

Given that history is relative and that there is no absolute standard applicable to the merits of civilisation, Herder asserted there is no reason why any people should not feel a sense of pride in their own particular cultural heritage. He argued that the notion of a superior European culture is a blatant insult to the majesty of Nature. He asserted that people do not have to feel their contemporary society and its attributes are inferior to those of others, even the magnificent achievements of Ancient Greece.

Even though, after his move to Weimar, Herder developed an increased interest in classicism, re-igniting his interest in Homer and Shakespeare above the vernacular *Sturm und Drang*, still he argued against the notion of an objective ideal of beauty as attributed to classical art. He opposed the notion of cultural absolutism and disagreed with Aristotle who had written in his 'Poetics' that there is one definitive way of expressing tragedy. Herder argued that the appreciation of beauty and art are relative to cultural values. He asserted that the art of classical culture is an ideal in its own terms and that German culture pertains to very different circumstances and accordingly to very different values and ideals. He argued that all the virtues asserted by Plato and Aristotle, however admirable, are situated in a historical context and are merely relative to that context.

Accordingly, German-speaking peoples should admire the accomplishments of their own heritage in its own right, such as the medieval triumphs of the Swabian emperors and the gothic era of

architecture. People should celebrate and feel pride in their own language and its heritage. People should value the work of writers who express and cultivate the very soul of their own folk.

Furthermore Herder argued that, given language itself contains the imprint of its heritage and contributes to the establishment of the values and conventions of its linguistic community, people should value above all else the work of the native poet who is the very voice and determinant of society.

Influence

Herder's approach to language cast a strong influence on the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt, who further developed the notion that language is inseparable from cultural values and from thought itself, and that each separate linguistic community is not subservient to reason alone but creates its own world-view. This theory was developed further in the twentieth century in the realm of Philosophy of Language by way of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which posits that the structure of any language affects the structure of its speakers' cognition.

Pedagogical Questions

1. To what extent are values regulated by their historical situation? Do they possess meaning beyond their context? What about justice, freedom, and human rights?
2. Is goodness defined by culture or is it universal (as described by Plato's 'Republic')?
3. Is the scientific view of the world defined by a historical situation?
4. What kinds of knowledge are not historically-situated? What about mathematics, logic and reason?
5. To what extent is thinking possible beyond the realm of language?

Quotes

"Human reason has been imagined as a new, quite separate force added into the soul which became the property of the human being in preference to all animals as an additional gift, and which must hence also be considered alone, like the fourth rung of a ladder after the three lowest ones. And that is indeed philosophical nonsense, however great the philosophers may be who say it. All the forces of our souls and of animals' souls are nothing but metaphysical abstractions, effects!" ('Treatise on the Origin of Language' (1772) in Herder, p83)

"Let us observe how annoyed and dismayed those people become to whom it suddenly presents itself in an unusual light. A good, honest man who only knows the world from the market-place, from the coffeehouse, and at most from the Hamburg Correspondent is as amazed when he comes upon a story and discovers that manner of thought and taste change with climate, with regions of the earth, and with countries..." ('On the Change of Taste' (1766) in Herder, p247)

“That no people long remained or could remain what it was; that each one, like each art and science and whatever in the world not?, had its period of growth, of bloom, and of decline; that each of these changing states only lasted the very small amount of time that could be given it on the wheel of human fate; finally, that no two moments in the world are the same, that consequently Egyptians, Romans and Greeks were also not the same at all times ... [Was] not Aristotle just as much a speculative head as Leibniz? Did not our northern peoples excel the Romans in bravery? Were all Egyptians, Greeks, Romans – all are rats and mice – like each other? No! But they are still rats and mice!” (‘This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity’ [Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, 1774] in Herder, p292-3)

Herder, Johann Gottfried. *Philosophical Writings*, trans. M. N. Forster. Cambridge University Press 2002.

Introduction to the music

The music asks questions. It asks about the relativism of values (bar 11), it considers the link between language and thought (bar 18), and it explores the nature of music knowledge (bar 29).

Johann Gottfried Herder: Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit [1784]

[illegible]

13

Picc. *mp* *f*

Fl. 1 *mp* *f*

Fl. 2 *mp* *f*

Ob. 1 *mp* *f*

C. A. *f* *mp* *f* *mp*

Cl. 1 *mp* *f* *mp*

Cl. 2 *mp* *f* *mp* *p*

B. Cl. *mp* *f* *mp* *p*

Bsn. 1 *mf* *mp* *p* *mf*

Cbsn. *mf* *p* *mp* *mf*

Hn. 1 *mf*

Hn. 2 *mf*

Hn. 3 *mf*

Tpt. 1 *mp* *f* *mf* *f*

Tpt. 2 *mp* *f* *mf* *f*

Tpt. 3 *f* *mp* *mf* *f*

Tbn. 1 *mf* *p*

B. Tbn. *mf* *p*

Tba. *mf* *p* *mf* *f*

Timp.

Tamb. *mp*

B. D. *mf* *p*

S. D. *mp* *mf* *mp*

Hr. *mf* *mp* *mp* *f* *mf* *mp*

Vln. I *p*

Vln. II *p*

Vla. *mp* *mf* *p* *mp* *p*

Vc. *mp* *f* *p* *mp*

Cb. *mf* *p* *mp*

B Of values

19

Picc. $mp < f > mp$ $p < f > p$ $p < f > p$ f $mp < f > mp$ $p < f > p$

Fl. 1 $mp < f > mp$ $p < f > p$

Fl. 2 $mp < f > mp$ $p < f > p$

Ob. 1 $mp < f > mp$ $p < f > p$ f $mp < f > mp$ $p < f > p$

C. A. $mp < f > mp$ $p < f > p$ f mp $p < f > p$

Cl. 1 p $mp < f > mp$ $p < f > p$ f $mp < f > mp$ $p < f > p$

Cl. 2 p $mp < f > mp$ $p < f > p$ f $mp < f > mp$ $p < f > p$

B. Cl. p $mp < f > mp$ $p < f > p$ f $mp < f > mp$ $p < f > p$

Bsn. 1 f $mp < f > mp$ $p < f > p$ f mp

Cbsn. f mf $mp < f > mp$ $p < f > p$ f

Hn. 1 f

Hn. 2 f

Hn. 3 f

Tpt. 1 mf f

Tpt. 2 mf f

Tpt. 3 mf f

Tbn. 1

B. Tbn. mp mp mp f

Tba. mp mp mp f

DCB/E/FGA

Timp. p f

Tamb. mf

B. D. $p < mf$ $p < mf$ $p < mf$

S. D. mf

B Of values

Vln. I pp

Vln. II pp

Vla. mp

Vc. p mp mp mp

Cb. mp mp f

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31

Picc. *p* *mf* *p*

Fl. 1 *p* *mf* *p*

Fl. 2 *p* *mf*

Ob. 1

C. A. *mp* *pp*

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn. 1 *mp*

Cbsn.

Hr. 1 *mp*

Hr. 2 *mp*

Hr. 3 *mp*

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn. 1

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp. *mf* *p*

B. D. *p*

S. D. *mp*

Hp.

Vln. I *f* *mp*

Vln. II *f* *mp*

Vla. *f* *mp*

Vcl. *f* *mp*

Cb. *f*

D Of universal knowledge

36

Picc. *mf*

Fl. 1 *mf*

Fl. 2 *p*

Ob. 1

C. A. *mf*

Cl. 1 *mf*

Cl. 2

B. Cl. *mf*

Bsn. 1 *p* *f*

Cbsn. *mf*

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1 *mf*

Tpt. 2 *mf*

Tpt. 3 *mf*

Tbn. 1 *mf*

B. Tbn. *p* *f*

Tba. *mf*

Timp.

Timp. *mf*

B. D. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

S. D. *mf* *mp* *mf* *p*

D Of universal knowledge

Vln. I *mf*

Vln. II *mf*

Vla. *mf*

Vc. *pizz. (div.)* *arco* *mf* *mp*

Cb. *pizz.* *arco* *mf* *mp*

E

43

Picc. *pp* ³

Fl. 1 *pp* ³

Fl. 2 *pp* ³

Ob. 1 *mf* *f*

C. A. *mf* *mf* *f*

Cl. 1 *mf* *f* *p* *mf* *p* *f*

Cl. 2 *mf* *f* *p* *mf* *p* *f*

B. Cl. *p* *mf* *p* *f*

Bsn. 1 *mf* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Cbsn. *f*

Hr. 1 *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Hr. 2 *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Hr. 3 *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Tpt. 1 *mf* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Tpt. 2 *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Tpt. 3 *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Tbn. 1 *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

B. Tbn. *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Tba. *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Timp. *mf* *f* *f*

B. D. *mf* *p* *mf* *f* *mp* *f*

S. D. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Hp. *p* *mf* *p* *f*

Vln. I *mf* *f* *f* *p* *mf*

Vln. II *mp* *mf* *f* *f*

Vla. *mf* *div.* *f* *unis.* *f*

Vc. *mf* *unis.* *f* *f*

Cb. *mf* *f* *f* *mf*

E

54

Picc. *mf* *pp* *mf*

Fl. 1 *mf* *pp* *mf*

Fl. 2 *mp*

Ob. 1 *f* *f*

C. A.

Cl. 1 *mp*

Cl. 2 *mp*

B. Cl. *mp* *f* 3

Bsn. 1 *f* 3

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1 *f*

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn. 1

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp. *f*

B. D. *mf*

Hi Hat.

Ped. B. D. *p*

Vln. I *f* *f*

Vln. II *mf* *f*

Vla. *p* *mf* *f* *div.* 3

Vc. *p* *mf* *f* *div.* 3

Cb. *f* 3 *div.* 3

F

58

Picc. *pp* *mf* *pp* *mf*

Fl. 1 *pp* *mf* *pp* *mf*

Fl. 2 *pp* *mf*

Ob. 1 *f* *mf* *f* *mf* *f*

C. A. *mf* *f* *mf* *f*

Cl. 1 *mf* *f* *p* *mf* *p* *f* *mp*

Cl. 2 *mf* *f* *p* *mf* *p* *f* *mp*

B. Cl. *mf* *f* *p* *mf* *p* *f* *mp*

Bsn. 1 *mf* *f* *p* *mf* *p* *f* *mp*

Cbsn. *mf* *f* *mf* *f*

Hn. 1 *mf* *f*

Hn. 2 *mf* *f*

Hn. 3 *mf* *f*

Tpt. 1 *f* *mf* *f* *mf* *f*

Tpt. 2 *mf* *f* *mf* *f*

Tpt. 3 *mf* *f* *mf* *f*

Tbn. 1

B. Tbn.

Tba. *mf* *f*

Timp.

Tamb. *mp* *mf*

S. D. *mp* *mf* *mp* *mf*

Hi Hat. *p*

Hp. *p* *mf* *p* *f* *p* *p* *p*

Vin. I. *f* *pizz.* *f* *arco* *p* *mf* *p*

Vin. II. *f* *pizz.* *f* *arco* *mf* *f* *arco* *p*

Vla. *p* *pizz.* *f* *arco* *p* *mf* *p*

Vc. *pizz.* *p* *f*

Cb. *f* *pizz.* *f* *p* *f*

F

64

Picc. *mf* *pp* *mf* *pp* *mf* *pp* *mf* *pp*

Fl. 1 *mf* *pp* *mf* *pp* *mf* *pp* *mf* *pp*

Fl. 2 *mp* *pp* *mp* *pp* *mp* *pp* *mp* *pp*

Ob. 1

C. A.

Cl. 1 *mp* *p* *mf* *p* *f* *mp* *mp*

Cl. 2 *mp* *p* *mf* *p* *f* *mp* *mp*

B. Cl. *mp* *p* *f* *mp* *mp*

Bsn. 1

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn. 1

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp.

Hi Hat *p* *p*

Ped B.D. *p* *p*

Hp. *p* *mf* *p* *f* *p* *p*

Vln. I *p* *mf*

Vln. II

Vla. *p* *mf* *p* *mp* *p*

Vc. *p* *arco* *p*

Ch.

69

G

Picc. *mf*

Fl. 1 *mf*

Fl. 2 *mf*

Ob. 1 *mf* *f* *mf* *f* *f*

C. A. *mf* *f* *mf* *f* *f*

Cl. 1 *mf*

Cl. 2 *mf*

B. Cl. *f* *3*

Bsn. 1 *f* *f* *f* *3*

Cbsn.

Hn. 1 *f* *3*

Hn. 2 *f* *3*

Hn. 3 *f* *f* *f* *f*

Tpt. 1 *mf* *f* *mf* *f* *f*

Tpt. 2 *mf* *f* *mf* *f* *f*

Tpt. 3 *mf* *f* *mf* *f* *f*

Tbn. 1 *f* *3*

B. Tbn. *f* *3*

Tba. *f* *3*

Timp. *f* *f* *f*

B. D. *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f*

Hi Hat *3* *3* *3* *3*

S. Cym. *p* *f* *p* *f*

Ped. B.D.

G

Vln. I *f*

Vln. II *mf*

Vla. *mf* *f* *mf* *f* *f* *3*

Vc. *mf* *f* *mf* *f* *f* *3* *div.*

Cb. *mf* *f* *mf* *f* *f* *3* *arco div.*

H

73

Picc.

Fl. 1

Fl. 2

Ob. 1

C. A.

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn. 1

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn. 1

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp.

B. D.

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Cb.

H

8/

Picc. Fl. 1 Fl. 2 Ob. 1 C. A. Cl. 1 Cl. 2 B. Cl. Bsn. 1 Cbsn. Hn. 1 Hn. 2 Hn. 3 Tpt. 1 Tpt. 2 Tpt. 3 Tbn. 1 B. Tbn. Tba. Timp. B. D. Hp. Vln. I Vln. II Vla. Vc. Cb.

mp mf f

mf p mf p mf

1

Picc. *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Fl. 1 *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Fl. 2 *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Ob. 1 *f* *mp* *f* *mp*

C. A. *f* *mp* *f* *mp*

Cl. 1 *f* *mp* *f* *mp*

Cl. 2 *mp* *f* *mp* *p*

B. Cl. *mp* *f* *mp* *p*

Bsn. 1 *f* *mp* *f* *p*

Cbsn. *mp* *f* *p*

Hr. 1

Hr. 2

Hr. 3

Tpt. 1 *f* *mp* *f* *mp*

Tpt. 2 *f* *mp* *f* *mp*

Tpt. 3 *f* *mp* *f* *mp*

Tbn. 1

B. Tbn. *f* *p*

Tba.

Timp.

B. D. *mf* *p*

Hp. *mp* *f* *mf* *mp* *mp* *f* *mf* *mp*

1

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla. *mp* *mp* *f* *p*

Vc. *mp* *mp* *f* *p*

Cb. *mp* *f* *p* *mp*

Philip Armstrong

2. Friedrich Schiller

**Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen
[1794]**

2. Friedrich Schiller: Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen [1794]

The second section explores the text 'Letters upon the Aesthetic Education of Humanity' written by Schiller in 1794.

Introduction

Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) moved to Weimar in the Duchy of Saxe-Weimar in 1787 and was appointed professor of History and Philosophy at the dukedom's university in the nearby town of Jena two years later. Thereafter he developed a fruitful friendship with Goethe, who was well known to Schiller and all young intellectuals throughout Germany for his radical approach to writing. The period of friendship, even if sometimes stormy, and the creative literature that came out of it is now known as the golden era of Weimar Classicism.

Encouraged by Goethe, Schiller moved back into the town of Weimar in 1799 to pursue a career as a playwright. Together they established the Weimar Theater, which espoused values of dramatic aesthetics and contributed to a renaissance of drama throughout Germany.

Theory

Schiller's 'Letters upon the Aesthetic Education of Humanity' was a response to recent work in the field of ethics and aesthetics published by Immanuel Kant.¹ If Copernicus's astronomy had reversed the construct of space and placed the sun instead of the Earth at the centre of the solar system, then the Copernican Revolution in Kant's Critiques had done something similar for philosophy. It had placed the human mind at the centre of mental activity instead of reality. It had asserted that the content of thought and discernment, even the perception of time and space, represents not some mind-independent reality, a noumenal realm, but the structure of cognition itself.

Schiller did not argue with Kant's overall epistemological approach, but he refuted Kant's application of this characterisation of cognitive structure to the realms of aesthetics and ethics, and in particular the proposal of a categorical imperative.

Kant had described the world as defined by human cognition as existing in terms of two conflicting components.² On one side there is the capacity for reason that is rational and based upon *a priori* knowledge gleaned by analytic means independent of experience; this enables the individual to conceive necessary and universal truths. On the other side is the capacity to perceive the physical, phenomenal realm based upon *a posteriori* knowledge gleaned through experience of the world; this enables the individual to safeguard their personal interests, and which in turn leads to negative pathologies; self-regard does not encourage any sense of natural goodness.

¹ See Kant, Immanuel, 1785. *The Moral Law: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral*, trans. H. J. Paton Routledge, 2012.

² Actually, there are many conflicting components in his system. For the complete set, see Kant, Immanuel, 1781. *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn. NY, Dover Publications, 2018.

Kant had said that, for a person to act in a moral way, human reason must subdue and control human physicality. This cannot be done by natural goodness, by resource only to the mental components of physicality. To act ethically merely out of good interest is a contradiction, for natural goodness leads only to a hypothetical imperative oriented merely on utilitarian outcomes, which are contingent and fallible. If I wish to play a particular piece of music well, then I must prepare through practise, and my aspirations and values are oriented merely on the end product, whatever that might be. Goodness is similarly contextual, subjective and vague. Kant insisted that such things cannot act as the foundation for moral action or as the basis for judgments in general.

Kant had said that, instead, moral behaviour requires the application of the categorical imperative, based on the triumph of human reason over human physicality. This establishes an unconditional requirement valid in all circumstances. It demands that individuals act according to universal law as intuited by rational reflection.

Kant had said that an ethical proposition such as 'You must not kill another human!' possesses its moral force not by way of some vague notion of 'goodness' but by way of universal necessity determined by the logical structure of existence, which in turn can be intuited only by way of reason. Pure practical reason enables an application of the pure reason of *a priori* knowledge in interactions with the empirical world.

In his 'Letters', Schiller agreed with Kant's characterisation of human cognition comprising two components, reason and the empirical. However he refutes the argument that moral acts require the suppression of the latter by the former, the suppression of sensuousness with rationality. He argued this approach to ethics must inevitably lead to political authoritarianism and deprive people of freedom. He argued, as had been argued before by Baumgarten,³ that the study of philosophy must be firmly rooted in a cultivated sense of beauty and an aesthetic state of mind.

Schiller further refuted the notion that human physicality leads necessarily to immoral behaviour. Quite the opposite! Artistic creativity is grounded in human sensuousness and aesthetics, not rationality, and these things possess goodness in themselves. The faculties of compassion and creativity are as important to the cognition of a balanced person as the faculty of reason.

Schiller argued that moral goodness comes not through a subordination of sensuousness through reason but by way of a balance between the two. He characterised the interaction between them as a 'play drive'. He argued that a person who is able to use the creative force of play to achieve equilibrium between these two drives, to fuse reason and physical desires, has the potential to become a 'beautiful soul'.

Schiller argued that, in order to advance the goals of political emancipation, society must strive to educate its citizens in the sensuous impulses and emotions expressed through art, which, used constructively, are able to bring emotions into harmony with reason. This harmony in turn has the potential to create a society of beautiful souls who are truly free and able to act morally.

³ The full version is available only in German. See Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb, 1750. *Aesthetica*. G. Olms.

Influence

Schiller's work had a significant impact upon the Early Romantics who were based in the towns of Weimar and Jena, and who applied the notion of aesthetics not only to art and drama but to all human endeavours, and even to the realm of nature itself. In Vienna, Beethoven used sections from Schiller's poem 'Ode to Joy' for the final movement of his Ninth Symphony.

Pedagogical Questions

1. To what extent does human cognition reflect or represent or mirror a mind-independent world?
2. What is the proper place of ethics and aesthetics in people's lives?
3. How is it possible for moral realists to define universal moral truths by way of reason?

Quotes

"The sensuous impulsion excludes from its subject all autonomy and freedom; the formal impulsion excludes all dependence and passivity. But the exclusion of freedom is physical necessity; the exclusion of passivity is moral necessity. Thus the two impulses subdue the mind: the former to the laws of nature, the latter to the laws of reason. It results from this that the instinct of play, which unites the double action of the two other instincts, will content the mind at once morally and physically." (Schiller, Letter XIV)

"If in the dynamic state of rights men mutually move and come into collision as forces, in the moral (ethical) state of duties, man opposes to man the majesty of the laws, and chains down his will. In this realm of the beautiful or the aesthetic state, man ought to appear to man only as a form, and an object of free play. To give freedom through freedom is the fundamental law of this realm." (Schiller, Letter XXVII)

Schiller, J. C. Friedrich Von, 1795. *Letters Upon The Aesthetic Education of Man*. Blackmask, 2002.

Introduction to the music

The music affirms and divulges the equilibrium of the play-drive (bar 8). The harp and flutes assert the aesthetic state of mind (bar 19). A solo flute gesture reveals the freedom and morality of a beautiful soul (bar 66).

Philip Armstrong

This page of the musical score is for the woodwind, brass, and percussion sections. The tempo is marked "Andante Moderato" with a metronome marking of 96. The woodwind section includes Piccolo, Flute, Oboe, Cor Anglais, Clarinet in Bb, Bass Clarinet in Bb, Bassoon, and Contrabassoon. The brass section includes Horn in F, Trumpet in C, Trombone, Bass Trombone, and Tuba. The percussion section includes Timpani, Cymbals, Bass Drum, and Tambourine. The string section is partially visible at the bottom, including Violin I, Violin II, Viola, Violoncello, and Contrabass. The score features various dynamics such as *p*, *mf*, *f*, *pp*, and *mp*, as well as articulations like accents and slurs. The woodwinds and brass have complex melodic lines with many accidentals. The percussion section provides a rhythmic foundation with patterns on the timpani, cymbals, and bass drum.

A Equilibrium of the play-drive

7

Pic. *f*

Fl. *f*

Fl. *mf* *mf*

Ob. *f*

C. A. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Cl. *mp* *f*

Cl. *mf* *mf*

B. Cl. *mf* *mf*

Bsn. *mf* *mf* *mf* *mf* *mf*

Cbsn.

Hn. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Hn. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Hn. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

C. Tpt. *mf* *mf* *mp*

C. Tpt. *mf* *mf* *mf* *mf* *mp*

C. Tpt. *mf* *mf* *mf* *mf* *mp*

Tbn. *mf* *mf* *mf* *mf* *mf*

B. Tbn. *mf* *mf* *mf* *mf* *mf*

Tba. *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Timp. *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f*

B. D. *p* *f*

Tamb. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

A Equilibrium of the play-drive

Vln. I *f p* *mp* *f* *f p* *mp* *f*

Vln. II *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Vla. *f p* *mp* *f* *f p* *mp* *f*

Vc. *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Cb.

12

Picc. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Fl. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Fl. *mf* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Ob. *f* *p* *f* *p*

C. A. *f*

Cl. *f*

Cl. *mf* *f*

B. Cl. *mf* *mp* *f*

Bsn. *mp* *f*

Cbsn. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *ff*

Hn. *mp* *ff* *mf*

Hn. *mp* *ff* *mf*

Hn. *ff* *mf*

C. Tpt. *f* *p* *f* *p*

C. Tpt. *f* *p* *f* *p*

C. Tpt. *f* *p*

Tbn. *ff*

B. Tbn. *ff* *mf*

Tba. *ff*

Timp. *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *ff*

B. D. *p* *ff* *mf*

Tamb. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Hp. *p* *f* *p* *f* *f* *mf*

Vln. I *f* *p* *mp* *f* *pizz.* *mp* *mf*

Vln. II *f* *p* *mp* *f* *f* *mf*

Vla. *f* *p* *mp* *f* *f*

Vc. *div.* *mp* *pizz. unis.* *f* *f* *f* *f*

Cb. *arco* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *f*

B The aesthetic state of mind**C**

10

Picc. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

Fl. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

Fl. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

Ob.

C. A.

Cl.

Cl. *p*

B. Cl.

Bsn.

Cbsn. *mf*

Hn.

Hn.

Hn.

C. Tpt.

C. Tpt.

C. Tpt.

Tbn. *mf*

B. Tbn.

Tba. *mf*

Timp. *mf*

Hp. *p*

Detailed description: This block contains the first system of a musical score, measures 1 through 10. The instruments listed on the left are Piccolo, Flute 1, Flute 2, Oboe, Cor Anglais, Clarinet 1, Clarinet 2, Bass Clarinet, Bassoon, Contrabassoon, Horn 1, Horn 2, Horn 3, Trumpet 1, Trumpet 2, Trumpet 3, Tenor Trombone, Baritone Trombone, Tuba, Timpani, and Harp. The Piccolo part begins with a triplet of eighth notes in measure 1, marked *mf*. The Flute 1 and 2 parts have a melodic line starting in measure 2, with dynamics *p*, *mf*, and *p* alternating. The Clarinet 2 part has a melodic line starting in measure 2, marked *p*. The Harp part has a continuous arpeggiated accompaniment starting in measure 1, marked *p*. The Bassoon and Tuba parts have a rhythmic pattern starting in measure 1, marked *mf*. The Timpani part has a rhythmic pattern starting in measure 1, marked *mf*. The Horns and Trumpets are silent. The Tenor Trombone and Baritone Trombone parts are silent. The Tuba part has a rhythmic pattern starting in measure 1, marked *mf*. The Harp part has a continuous arpeggiated accompaniment starting in measure 1, marked *p*. The Piccolo part has a melodic line starting in measure 1, marked *mf*. The Flute 1 and 2 parts have a melodic line starting in measure 2, with dynamics *p*, *mf*, and *p* alternating. The Clarinet 2 part has a melodic line starting in measure 2, marked *p*. The Clarinet 1 part is silent. The Bass Clarinet part is silent. The Bassoon part has a rhythmic pattern starting in measure 1, marked *mf*. The Contrabassoon part is silent. The Horn 1, 2, and 3 parts are silent. The Trumpet 1, 2, and 3 parts are silent. The Tenor Trombone and Baritone Trombone parts are silent. The Tuba part has a rhythmic pattern starting in measure 1, marked *mf*. The Timpani part has a rhythmic pattern starting in measure 1, marked *mf*. The Harp part has a continuous arpeggiated accompaniment starting in measure 1, marked *p*. The Piccolo part has a melodic line starting in measure 1, marked *mf*. The Flute 1 and 2 parts have a melodic line starting in measure 2, with dynamics *p*, *mf*, and *p* alternating. The Clarinet 2 part has a melodic line starting in measure 2, marked *p*. The Clarinet 1 part is silent. The Bass Clarinet part is silent. The Bassoon part has a rhythmic pattern starting in measure 1, marked *mf*. The Contrabassoon part is silent. The Horn 1, 2, and 3 parts are silent. The Trumpet 1, 2, and 3 parts are silent. The Tenor Trombone and Baritone Trombone parts are silent. The Tuba part has a rhythmic pattern starting in measure 1, marked *mf*. The Timpani part has a rhythmic pattern starting in measure 1, marked *mf*. The Harp part has a continuous arpeggiated accompaniment starting in measure 1, marked *p*.

B The aesthetic state of mind**C**

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Cb. *mf*

Detailed description: This block contains the second system of a musical score, measures 1 through 10. The instruments listed on the left are Violin 1, Violin 2, Viola, Violoncello, and Contrabass. The Violin 1 and 2 parts are silent. The Viola part is silent. The Violoncello part is silent. The Contrabass part has a rhythmic pattern starting in measure 1, marked *mf*. The Violin 1 and 2 parts are silent. The Viola part is silent. The Violoncello part is silent. The Contrabass part has a rhythmic pattern starting in measure 1, marked *mf*.

This image shows a page of a musical score, likely for a symphony. The score is written for a large ensemble of instruments, including woodwinds, brass, percussion, and strings. The instruments listed on the left side of the page are: Picc., Fl., Fl., Ob., C. A., Cl., B. Cl., Bsn., Cbsn., Hn., Hn., Hn., C. Tpt., C. Tpt., C. Tpt., Tbn., B. Tbn., Tbn., Timp., Cym., Hrp., Vln. I, Vln. II, Vla., Vc., and Cb.

The score is written in a standard musical notation with staves for each instrument. The key signature is one flat (B-flat), and the time signature is 4/4. The score includes various dynamic markings such as *p* (piano), *mf* (mezzo-forte), *mp* (mezzo-piano), and *pp* (pianissimo). There are also markings for *arco* (arco) and *tr* (trill).

A rehearsal mark 'D' is present in the upper right corner of the page. The score is divided into measures by vertical bar lines. The page number '29' is visible in the top left corner.

37

E

Picc. *mf* *f*

Fl. *mf* *f* *mf* *f*

Fl. *f*

Ob. *mp* *f*

C. A. *mp* *f*

Cl. *mp* *f* *p* *f*

Cl. *mp* *f* *p* *f*

B. Cl. *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Bsn. *mp* *f*

Cbsn. *mp* *f*

Hr. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *f*

Hr. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *f*

Hr. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *f*

C. Tpt. *f* *p* *mf* *p* *f*

C. Tpt. *f* *p* *mf* *p* *f*

C. Tpt. *f* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *f*

Tbn. *f* *mf*

B. Tbn. *f* *mf* *mf*

Tba. *p* *f* *mf* *mf*

Timpani. *p* *f* *p* *f* *mf* *p* *f*

Cym. *p* *f* *p* *f*

E

Vln. I *f*

Vln. II *f* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *f* *p* *mf* *p* *f*

Vla. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *f* *p* *mf* *p* *f*

Vc. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Cb. *p* *f* *mf* *pizz.*

[illegible]

54 **G**

Picc. *f*

Fl. *f*

Fl. *mf*

Ob. *f*

C. A. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Cl. *mp* *f*

Cl. *mf* *mf*

B. Cl. *mf* *mf*

Bsn. *mf* *mf* *mf* *mf* *mf*

Cbsn.

Hn. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Hn. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Hn. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

C Tpt. *mf* *mf* *mp*

C Tpt. *mf* *mf* *mf* *mp*

C Tpt. *mf* *mf* *mf* *mf* *mp*

Tbn. *mf* *mf* *mf* *mf*

B. Tbn. *mf* *mf* *mf* *mf*

Tba. *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Temp. *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f*

B. D. *p* *f*

Tamb. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Vln. I *f* *p* *mp* *f* *f* *p* *mp* *f*

Vln. II *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Vla. *f* *p* *mp* *f* *f* *p* *mp* *f*

Vc. *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Cb.

39

Picc. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Fl. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Fl. *mf* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p*

Ob. *f* *p* *f* *p*

C. A. *f*

Cl. *f*

Cl. *mf* *f*

B. Cl. *mf* *mp* *f*

Bsn. *mp* *f*

Cbsn. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *f*

Hn. *mp* *ff* *mf*

Hn. *mp* *ff* *mf*

Hn. *ff* *mf*

C. Tpt. *f* *p* *f* *p*

C. Tpt. *f* *p* *f* *p*

C. Tpt. *f* *p*

Tbn. *ff*

B. Tbn. *ff* *mf*

Tba. *ff*

Timp. *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *ff*

B. D. *p* *ff* *mf*

Tamb. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f*

Hp. *p* *f* *p* *f* *f* *mf*

Vln. I *f* *p* *mp* *f* *pizz.* *mp* *mf*

Vln. II *f* *p* *mp* *f* *f* *mf*

Vla. *f* *p* *mp* *f* *f*

Vc. *div.* *mp* *pizz. unis.* *f* *f* *f* *f*

Cb. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *f*

H

66

Picc. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

Fl. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Fl. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

Ob.

C. A.

Cl.

Cl.

B. Cl.

Bsn.

Cbsn. *mf*

Hn.

Hn.

Hn.

C. Tpt.

C. Tpt.

C. Tpt.

Tbn. *mf*

B. Tbn.

Tba. *mf*

Timp. *mf*

Hp. *p*

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Cb. *mf*

I The freedom and morality of a beautiful soul

75

Picc.

Fl.

Fl.

Ob.

C. A.

Cl.

Cl.

B. Cl.

Bsn.

Cbsn.

Hn.

Hn.

Hn.

C Tpt.

C Tpt.

C Tpt.

Tbn.

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp.

Hp.

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Cb.

p *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

pp

p

pp

This is a page from a musical score, page 12, for a piece titled 'I The freedom and morality of a beautiful soul'. The score is for a large orchestra and includes parts for Piccolo, Flutes (1 and 2), Oboe, Cor Anglais, Clarinets (1 and 2), Bass Clarinet, Bassoon, Contrabassoon, Horns (1, 2, and 3), Trumpets (1, 2, and 3), Trombone, Baritone Trombone, Tuba, Timpani, Harp, Violins (1 and 2), Viola, Violoncello, and Contrabass. The Piccolo part has a rest. Flute 1 has a melodic line starting at measure 75 with dynamics *p*, *mf*, *p*, *mf*, and *p*. Flute 2 has a rest. The Oboe, Cor Anglais, Clarinets, Bass Clarinet, Bassoon, and Contrabassoon parts have rests. The Horns, Trumpets, Trombone, Baritone Trombone, and Tuba parts have rests. The Timpani part has a rest. The Harp part has a complex rhythmic pattern starting at measure 75 with a *p* dynamic. The Violins, Viola, Violoncello, and Contrabass parts have rests. The score is written in 4/4 time and features a variety of musical notations including rests, melodic lines, and dynamic markings.

J [Exit dancers]

83

Pic. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

Fl. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

Fl.

Ob.

C. A.

Cl.

Cl.

B. Cl.

Bsn.

Cbsn. *mp*

Hn.

Hn.

Hn.

C. Tpt. *con sord.* *pp* *mp* open

C. Tpt. *con sord.* *pp* *mp* open

C. Tpt. *con sord.* *pp* *mp* open

Tbn.

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp.

Hp. *mf* *p*

Vln. I *arco* *pp* *mf*

Vln. II *pp* *mf*

Vla. *pp* *mf*

Vc. *arco* *pp* *mf*

Cb. *mf*

3. Johann Gottlieb Fichte

**Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre
[1794/5]**

3. Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre [1794/5]

The third section explores the texts 'Foundations of the Science of Knowledge' and 'An Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre' [Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre], written by Fichte in 1794/5 and 1797/8 respectively.

Introduction

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762 - 1814) attended a theological seminary from the age of eighteen in Jena, the educational centre of the Duchy of Saxe-Weimar, and thereafter spent several years as a peripatetic teacher in several other German-speaking cities in the Holy Roman Empire.

Ten years later he developed a great interest in the work of Immanuel Kant and visited him in East Prussia in 1791. Inspired by their discussions Fichte published a book anonymously that further developed Kant's ideas. When the author of the book became public, after it had been first falsely attributed to Kant by some commentators and thereafter praised by Kant, Fichte developed a reputation as a leading Kant scholar. Accordingly he was invited back to Saxe-Weimar and received a posting to the University of Jena from 1794.

However Fichte taught in the dukedom for only five years. In 1799 he was ejected from his post following a scandal that involved a charge of atheism. He had argued that the nature of God was not something that existed in terms of itself but was a notion that could be conceived subjectively and in moral terms. His arguments upset many powerful theologians who used their influence with the sovereign Duke of Saxe-Weimar, Karl August, to force Fichte to resign.

Fichte was appointed professor of Philosophy at the University of Berlin where he became involved in the resistance to Napoleonic hegemony and a proponent of German nationalism until his death.

Theory

Fichte admired much of Kant's Transcendental Idealism, in particular the notion that mental 'phenomenal' representations are determined by foundational 'transcendental' laws of reason. However he refuted Kant's assertion that this implies the impossibility of knowing anything of an external reality, that scientific knowledge is impossible, and that metaphysics as it had been studied in the past is essentially meaningless.

Fichte argued that a solution to the challenges of Kant's epistemology could not be found in any form of Dogmatic Idealism, including that associated with the philosophers Leibniz and Berkeley, which asserted the primacy of mind-dependent subjectivism and, by implication, entirely denied the existence of an external world. Fichte sought to establish a justification for knowledge of a mind-independent domain and thus to establish the epistemic foundations for an empirical realism.

Fichte proposed an adapted version of Transcendental or 'Critical' Idealism that built upon the work of Kant but that established the simultaneous integrity and interdependence of subject and object. Employing an approach that he called the *Wissenschaftslehre*, the Doctrine of Scientific Knowledge,

Fichte's goal was to re-establish the metaphysical place of the objective, and thus defend Idealism against accusations of scepticism, solipsism, and nihilism. He argued that philosophy must explain the foundations of experience and that, consequently, any philosophical object of study must necessarily lie outside of immediate experience.

Fichte argued there are two theoretical notions that might be used for explaining experience: a) the concept of essential self-hood associated with the freedom of agency, and b) the concept of essential objectivity associated with causal necessity. He said that neither of these could be justified by way of a direct appeal to experience. Both can be established only by way of a self-conscious act of mental abstraction from experience.

Fichte acknowledged that a self-aware individual is able to differentiate between alternative forms of experience, and in particular between a) themselves as a self-conscious entity and b) the objects that exist independently of the self and its agency. The self and the objects are indivisible from one another, yet the individual is able to construct abstractions that elevate them above each of these different forms of experience. An abstraction from the self-conscious entity could be seen to reveal the essence of an object-in-itself and its place as the explanatory foundation of experience. This was the approach of Dogmatic Idealism as well as religious metaphysics, which, according to Fichte, leads ultimately to the false identification of the human soul as an object-in-itself. Conversely an abstraction from an object independent of the self reveals the mind itself as the explanatory foundation of experience. This is the approach of Critical Idealists, including that of Kant.

Fichte argued that Kant's notion of a noumenal world, the world of a mind-independent reality that the mind cannot know, should be abandoned. Instead it must be acknowledged that mental activity is not grounded in a so-called "real world" at all. Consciousness is not based upon anything beyond itself. The phenomenal world expressed by the conscious-self arises entirely from the construct of self-awareness.

Fichte called this foundational self-awareness the 'pure I.' He explained that the object of self-awareness appears within consciousness in the form of the I-in-itself. It is an object determined exclusively by the self, independent of experience, and that is the basis upon which the existence of all else is possible.

He said that the self-positing act of the 'pure I' is not an act of grasping something intentionally by means of particular concepts. It is grasped only when contrasted by way of an intuitive awareness of the not-I. And thereafter the mind observes only itself, even as this act of self-observation is engaged upon everything else by way of intentional thought, by way of the objects within self-awareness.

Fichte refuted Kant's refutation of the efficacy of intellectual intuition. He argued that this is the very faculty that enables the mind to intuit the self while also performing an act whereby the 'pure I' is constituted. Intellectual intuition is the capacity for self-awareness, and the means by which the self knows the actions of the self, and on which it is possible for the self to know something by way of performing these actions.

To emphasise the case against Dogmatic Idealism, Fichte emphasised that this did not imply a constitutive status for the mind whereby consciousness could be considered to construct or even create reality, which would in turn imply a denial of the noumenal reality and warrant accusations of solipsism. Fichte refuted one of the core tenets of Kant's transcendental account of experience, whereby it is the process of cognition itself that grounds the necessary causality of the physical world. In contrast, he argued that the mind acts in a purely regulative manner upon the objective mind-independent world.

Fichte argued that this approach enables reconciliation between a) the necessity of a physical world in which all objects and events in time and space are physical determinations, and b) the contingency of human freedom and agency. It could explain how freely-acting and morally responsible agents can at the same time be considered part of a world that is causally conditioned.

Fichte argued that the 'I' engaged in a pragmatic engagement with external reality. While the mind is determined by necessary laws that regulate mental representations and thought processes, the act of cognition is also a practical process. It is the practical reason that is the basis of knowledge.

Fichte argued that this approach to Critical Idealism asserts that the laws of reason regulating the mind establish conditions for the realisation which cannot be actualised if they are the sole basis for mental representations. An additional component derived from experience is required, which in turn supervenes upon a third component, and so forth until all of the conditions of the necessary laws are addressed and their full implications have become coherent.

Critical Idealism thus reveals that nothing can be present in consciousness independent of the holistic unity of experience. A person's knowledge amounts to the equivalent of the reality of the empirical realm. Accordingly Fichte refuted any distinction between knowledge formed *a priori*, accrued independently of experience, and knowledge formed *a posteriori*, accrued from experience. He asserted it is impossible by definition to distinguish between a phenomenon in experience and the respective thing-in-itself.

Fichte acknowledged that, by way of intellectual intuition, everything of experience can be known *a priori*. Idealism of the rational tradition had always treated knowledge as innate, given its restriction to the human mind. However Fichte argued, given that self-awareness and experience coincide, and given that the self is able to view knowledge as something given within experience, that this knowledge is also *a posteriori*. Accordingly Critical Idealism should not view the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* as two different domains, but as a single form of knowledge viewed from different perspectives. They are distinguishable only in terms of the means used to establish each of them.

Influence

Fichte was a founding figure of German Idealism, which developed from the theoretical and ethical writings of Immanuel Kant. He was the first to establish the Weimar Identity Thesis, asserting correspondence between the ideal realms of experience and reality. These philosophical traditions influenced all ensuing Weimar philosophers in one way or another, and in particular Hegel who further developed Fichte's notion of the dialectic as a practical form of rationality.

After his move to Berlin, Fichte became frequently and mistakenly associated with the notion of Subjective Idealism, which reiterates the arguments of George Berkeley that reality is constituted entirely by the mind. In this vein, Hegel characterised Fichte's approach as oriented on the subjective subject-object in contrast to the objective subject-object of Shelling's approach.⁴ Breazeale reported that Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi criticised Fichte's version of transcendental philosophy as no less guilty of nihilism than that of Kant.⁵

Fichte's prime thesis that *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge are indistinguishable was taken up again in the mid-twentieth century by Willard Quine, although with a different emphasis. Quine was an empiricist who denied this unity could be viewed as *a priori* at all.⁶

Pedagogical Questions

1. How is rational thought affected by either a) personal experience and/or b) a pre-set logical structure that is independent of experience?
2. To what degree is religious truth a subjective or objective matter?

Quotes

"Philosophy has to display the basis or foundation of all experience. Consequently, philosophy's object must necessarily lie outside of all experience." (Fichte 9)

"Yet who can prevent the dogmatist from assuming that the soul is one of the things in themselves? If this is the case then the soul is one of the things he postulates in order to carry out his task." (ibid 23)

A human agent "is able to engage in abstraction. That is to say, by means of a free act of thinking he is able to separate things that are connected with each other within experience. The thing, i.e., a determinate something that exists independently of our freedom and to which our cognition is supposed to be directed, and the intellect, i.e., the subject that is supposed to be engaged in this activity of cognising, are inseparably connected with each other within experience. The philosopher is able to abstract from either one of these, and when he does so he has abstracted from experience and has thereby succeeded in elevating himself above experience. If he abstracts from the thing, then he is left with an intellect in itself as the explanatory ground of experience; that is to say, he is left with the intellect in abstraction from its relationship to existence. If he abstracts from the intellect, then he is left with a thing in itself (that is, in abstraction from the fact that it occurs within experience)

⁴ See section 6, or go straight to p155 in Hegel, G. W. F. *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy* [Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie, 1801], trans. H. S. Harris & Walter Cerf. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1977.

⁵ See Breazeale, D, 2018. *Johann Gottlieb Fichte*. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta.

⁶ The original explains matters in greater detail. See Quine, Willard. *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*. Philosophical Review 60 (1): 20–43, 1951.

as the explanatory ground of experience. The first was of proceeding is called idealism; the second is called dogmatism." (ibid 11)

"The object of idealism appears within consciousness as an I in itself. It ... is determined solely by me, and without this determination it is nothing whatsoever and does not exist at all." (ibid 13)

"The intellect, as such, only serves itself, and this act of self-observation is immediately directed at everything that the intellect is." (ibid 20)

"What is this self-reverting act of the I? Among which class of modifications of consciousness should it be posited? It is not an act of comprehending anything by means of concepts. It first becomes an act of comprehension only when it is opposed to a Not-I and only insofar as the I itself is determined within this opposition. Consequently the act in question is a mere intuition." (ibid 42)

"A finite rational being possesses nothing whatsoever beyond experience. The entire contents of his thinking are comprised within experience." (ibid 10)

"To the extent that these final results of idealism are viewed as results, i.e., to the extent that they are viewed as conclusions of a chain of argument, they are "*a priori*" and contained within the human mind. To the extent, however, that argument and experience actually coincide and one views these same results as something given within experience, then they can be called "*a posteriori*". For a full blown idealism, *a priori* and *a posteriori* and not two different things, but are one and the same thing, simply looked at from two different sides, and they can be distinguished from each other only in terms of the different means one employs in order to arrive at each." (ibid 32)

Fichte, Johann Gottlob, 1797-1800. *Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre*. trans. Breazeale. Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 1994.

Introduction to the music

The orchestral brass sounds declamatory assertions of all reality encompassed by musical experience. A descending motif attests of elevation by abstraction. A rhythmic figure is assertive of the Weimar Identity Thesis; it contends the free intuition of the 'I' and the 'not-I'.

Philip Armstrong

[illegible]

B All reality encompassed by musical experience

11

Picc. *f*

Fl. 1 *f*

Fl. 2 *f*

Ob. *f*

C. A. *f*

Cl. 1 *f*

Cl. 2 *f*

B. Cl. *f*

Bsn. *f*

Cbsn. *f*

Hn. 1 *f*

Hn. 2 *f*

Hn. 3 *f*

Tpt. 1 *f*

Tpt. 2 *f*

Tpt. 3 *f*

Tbn. *f*

B. Tbn. *f*

Tba. *f*

Temp. 1: F, 2: C, 3: A, 4: G *f*

Cym. *p* *f*

Cym. *p* *f*

B All reality encompassed by musical experience

Vln. I *f* *unis.*

Vln. II *f* *unis.*

Vla. *f* *unis.*

Vc. *f* *unis.*

Cb. *f*

C Elevation by abstraction

2/

Picc. *mp* *f*

Fl. 1 *mp* *f*

Fl. 2 *mf* *f*

Ob. *f*

C. A. *mp* *f*

Cl. 1 *mp* *mf* *f*

Cl. 2 *mp* *f*

B. Cl. *mp* *f*

Bsn. *mp* *f*

Cbsn. *mp* *f*

Hn. 1 *mp*

Hn. 2 *mp*

Hn. 3 *mp*

Tpt. 1 *mp* *f*

Tpt. 2 *mp* *f*

Tpt. 3 *mp* *f*

Tbn. *mp* *mp* *f*

B. Tbn. *mp* *f*

Tba. *mp* *f*

Temp. *mp* *mp* *f*

Cym. *p* *mf* *f*

S. D. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Ped. B. D. *mf*

Hp. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

C Elevation by abstraction

Vln. I *mp* *mf* *f*

Vln. II *mp* *mf* *f*

Vla. *mp*

Vc. *mp* *pizz.* *f*

Cb. *mp* *f*

33 D

Picc. 

Fl. 1 

Fl. 2 

Ob. 

C. A. 

Cl. 1  *mp* *f*

Cl. 2  *mp* *f*

B. Cl. 

Bsn.  *f*


Cbsn.  *f*

Hn. 1  *f*


Hn. 2  *f*


Hn. 3  *f*


Tpt. 1 

Tpt. 2  *f*

Tpt. 3  *f*

Tbn.  *f*

B. Tbn.  *f*

Tba.  *f*

Timp.  *f*

Cym.  *p*

S. D. 

Ped. B. D. 

Hp. 

Vln. I  *mp* *f*

Vln. II  *mp* *f*

Vla.  *f*

Vc.  *f*

Cb.  *f*

D

E Allegro $\text{♩} = 124$

47

Picc.

Fl. 1

Fl. 2

Ob.

C. A.

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn.

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn.

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Tim.

Cym.

S. D.

Cym.

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Cb.

E Allegro $\text{♩} = 124$

F Assertive of the Weimar Identity Thesis

56

Picc. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mp* *mf*

Fl. 1 *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mp* *mf*

Fl. 2 *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mp* *mf*

Ob. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mp* *mf*

C. A. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mp* *mf*

Cl. 1 *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mp* *mf*

Cl. 2 *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mp* *mf*

B. Cl. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mp* *mf*

Bsn. *mf* *mf*

Cbsn. *mf* *mf*

Hn. 1 *mp* *p* *mp* *mf*

Hn. 2 *mp* *p* *mp* *mf*

Hn. 3 *mp* *mf*

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn.

B. Tbn.

Tba. *mf*

Timpani *f* *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *mp*

T. D. *f* *p* *f* *p* *f*

S. D. *mp*

Tri. *mp*

F Assertive of the Weimar Identity Thesis

Vln. I *mp* *p* *mp* *mf*

Vln. II *mp* *mf* *p* *mp* *mf*

Vla. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mp* *mf*

Vc. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mp* *mf*

Cb. *mf*

H

I

83

Pic. *p mp mf*

Fl. 1 *p mp mf*

Fl. 2 *p mp mf*

Ob. *p mp mf*

C. A. *p mp mf*

Cl. 1 *p mp mf*

Cl. 2 *p mp mf*

B. Cl. *p mp mf*

Bsn. *p mp mf*

Cbsn. *p mp mf*

Hn. 1 *p mp mf*

Hn. 2 *p mp mf*

Hn. 3 *p mp mf*

Tpt. 1 *f > p*

Tpt. 2 *f > p*

Tpt. 3 *f > p*

Tbn. *f > p*

B. Tbn. *f > p*

Tba. *f > p*

Temp. *f > mp*

T. D. *p < f*

S. D. *f p < f*

Hi-Hat. *p*

Tri. *p*

Ped. B. D. *f p*

I

Vln. I *p mp mf f > p*

Vln. II *p mp mf f p < f*

Vla. *p mp mf f > p*

Vc. *p mp mf f > p*

Cb. *p mp mf f > p*

div.

div.

K

Philip Armstrong

M

[illegible]

123

N

Pic. *f*

Fl. 1 *f*

Fl. 2 *f*

Ob. *f*

C. A. *f*

Cl. 1 *f*

Cl. 2 *f*

B. Cl. *f*

Bsn. *f*

Cbsn. *f*

Hn. 1 *f*

Hn. 2 *f*

Hn. 3 *f*

Tpt. 1 *f* *mp* *f* *mp*

Tpt. 2 *f* *mp* *f* *mp*

Tpt. 3 *f* *mp* *f* *mp*

Tbn. *f*

B. Tbn. *f*

Tba. *f*

Timp. *p* *f* *p*

Cym. *p* *f*

S. D.

N

Vln. I *f*

Vln. II *f*

Vla. *f*


Vc. *f*


Cb. *f*

134

Picc. 

Fl. 1 


Fl. 2 

Ob. 

C. A. 

Cl. 1 

Cl. 2 

B. Cl. 

Bsn. 

Cbsn. 


Hn. 1 


Hn. 2 


Hn. 3 

Tpt. 1 

Tpt. 2 

Tpt. 3 

Tbn. 

B. Tbn. 

Tba. 

Timp. 

Vln. I 

Vln. II 

Vla. 

Vc. 

Cb. 

4. Friedrich Hölderlin

Der Tod des Empedokles [1797-1800]

4. Friedrich Hölderlin: Der Tod des Empedokles [1797-1800]

The fourth section explores 'The Death of Empedocles', an incomplete drama written by Hölderlin in three versions between 1797 and 1800.

Introduction

The poetry of Johann Christian Friedrich Hölderlin (1770 – 1843) represents one of the great achievements of German literature. Born of the era of classical Weimar, and inspired by the work of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, the text reveals a fascination with ancient Greek culture that strives to give the Hellenic gods new meaning by bringing them to life through verse. 'The Death of Empedocles' uses the Greek heritage to explore the dynamics of reason *visa-vi* compassion and love and the nature of philosophical truth.

Hölderlin was also central to the development of Absolute Idealism and Early Romanticism. Originally from Württemberg, and after travelling extensively as a young man, Hölderlin moved to the Duchy of Weimar in 1794/5 to study philosophy at the University of Jena. He attended Fichte's classes and interacted with Goethe, Novalis and other influential figures of the time. These activities caused him eventually to reject Fichte's doctrine of the subjective status of subject-object identity. Hölderlin argued instead for the independent reality of nature. Furthermore, in common with Schiller, he asserted the possibility of metaphysical insight by way of an aesthetic intuition. He argued for a role for literature and art in perceiving the absolute objectively.

Sadly he suffered a gradual mental breakdown from the age of thirty and subsequently returned to Württemberg to live as a recluse for the remainder of his life.

Theory

Hölderlin's philosophical ideas are best expressed in the short text 'Das älteste Systemprogramm',⁷ which was unsigned but written soon after Hölderlin was in Weimar and most likely attributable to him (and Schelling). It aims to build on the transcendental idealism of Kant and define the principles of a new approach to idealism.

Hölderlin was of the same mind as many others of his generation as regards the Weimar Identity Thesis, asserting the ideal equivalency of the world as it exists and the world as it is known. He acknowledged Fichte's premise that self-consciousness requires a pure identity of subject and object, an epistemic unity of the *a priori* and *a posteriori*, however he doubted that this equivalency could be constituted by self-consciousness itself. He pointed out that any assertion that knowledge constitutes reality, which in turn constitutes knowledge, is a circular one. He argued that if subject-object identity transcends self-consciousness then it cannot by definition be subjective in itself.

⁷ Anon, attributed to Hölderlin & Schelling, 1796/7. *The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism* [Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus]. Rosenzweig, 1917.

Hölderlin posited that, given this identity is taken to encompass the entirety of reality, then it must be definition be everything. There can be nothing outside of it. Accordingly the identity which contains the absolute ego cannot itself constitute an object, given that this object would then be constituted outside itself. Furthermore, given there cannot be consciousness without an object, the absolute ego cannot be conscious itself, and that which cannot be conscious cannot be an ego. Accordingly Fichte's absolute cannot itself be subjective. Consequently it must be objective. Accordingly the first principle of metaphysics is not the subject but the entirety of the universe.

Hölderlin joined the heated debates about the work of seventeenth century Dutch philosopher, Baruch Spinoza, which argued against mind-body dualism and in favour of a rationalist monism formed of a fundamental substance.⁸ Hölderlin concurred with Herder and Schiller in the controversy, both of whom had rejected the argument that such a rationalism and deterministic universe must by definition be indifferent to morality and devoid of any form of philosophical or divine meaning. Together they had outlined instead a vitalistic monism that characterised fundamental substance as the living dynamic force of nature, something which could be perceived and known by a human subject in its absolute terms as possessing purpose.

Hölderlin argued that this approach was a fierce repudiation of Fichte's subjectivity, and in particular his argument that aesthetics was nothing more than an arena for the exercise of moral duty, which threatened to extinguish nature, turning it into an empty wilderness deprived of any sense of splendour, mystery or enchantment.

Furthermore, like most Weimar philosophers of the era, Hölderlin refuted Kant's doctrine of the impossibility of objective knowledge. He suggested it was only pre-conceptions and prejudice that had motivated Kant and Fichte in turn to use reason as the starting point for the construction of the world, and nothing more substantial. Hölderlin argued that reason cannot in itself act as a basis for objectivity, or in turn for any divine truth. Instead this starting point must be an aesthetic attitude towards nature. He argued that human cognition possessed the capacity to intuit metaphysical truth. He maintained it is feasible to justify ontological commitment by way of self-consciousness. However he believed it is only possible to do this in terms of an aesthetic intuition, rather than in terms of theoretical and practical reason.

Hölderlin maintained that the absolute can be perceived cognitively only as the object of a special kind of experience. It is the feeling or intuition that arises from the mental capacity for aesthetic (i.e. phenomenal) sense. He argued further that this aesthetic intuition possessed more than the regulative role outlined by Schiller. He challenged Schiller's notion of the subordinate status of the aesthetic to the moral through freedom. He asserted that this sense of intuition possessed a constitutive status pertaining to the structure of reality.

Hölderlin argued further that it is only aesthetics that can save intellectual discourse from scepticism and from what he insisted was the illusion of pure reason. Like Schiller, he believed that the essence

⁸ Look online for Spinoza, Baroch, 1678. *Ethics, demonstrated in geometrical order* [Ethica, Ordine Geometrico demonstrata].

of beauty is not that of a mere pastime for taking pleasure in appearances. Instead it is here that the harmonic structure of reality itself can be discovered.

In the 'Systemprogramm', the text takes as a starting point the free agent as a self-conscious being facing nature as a creative spirit. By way of mental capacities, the free agent constitutes the existence of humanity, freedom, immortality, and the existence of Platonic beauty with special regard to its constitution through poetry. It is able to see through the false conventions of religious superstition and even the notion of the aristocratic state. All of the legitimate entities are perceived as structured by reason, but this perception is aesthetic in nature.

However Hölderlin conceded that art is not necessarily a suitable medium for articulating philosophical propositions. Art and philosophy are not alternative representations of the same content. Instead art claims its authority in terms of its enabling of insight by way of the aesthetic sense, a capacity that philosophy can only pre-suppose.

Following his time in Weimar, Hölderlin moved to Frankfurt, in part to isolate himself from the heady demands of the intellectual climate in Weimar and thus to be able to reconcile his interest in philosophy with his passion for poetic expression.

Krell⁹ wrote that composing 'The Death of Empedocles' gave Hölderlin the opportunity to set aside the theoretical matters of philosophical speculation and to focus instead on matters of aesthetics and in turn of social morality. He could immerse himself in a romantic mysticism based on divine naturalism and that was able to lift the self above the mundanities of earthly existence.

Once again Hölderlin took inspiration from ancient Greek pantheism. His confidence in an ideal realm had been undermined by his intense study of Fichte's writing and the contention that it is the subjective mind alone that gives meaning to the world. However now he could once again become immersed in a cosmos which manifests the nature of divinity in all its deeds.

Hölderlin was able to assert a Platonist account of companionship and love, of the Eros as a fundamental creative force that in turn is the source of morality and social harmony. He admired many of Plato's dialogues and in particular the 'Phaedrus' with its discussion of the divine source of madness, of the madness of love, of love as inspiration for art and writing, and of poetry as the supreme medium for portraying the myth of the tragic fall.

Diogenes' account of Empedocles attracted Hölderlin especially. The ancient Sicilian thinker of Greek heritage was described not only as a distinguished egalitarian, true to the welfare of the people, important to all post-French Revolution republicans, but also a pertinent voice in philosophical speculation. He had taken the very first monist account written by Parmenides, who was his teacher, prepared long before the equivalent account of Spinoza, and added to it the oppositional forces of love and strife.

⁹ For an excellent commentary, see Krell, D. F. *General introduction* in *The Death of Empedocles* by Hölderlin, trans. Krell. Albany, State University of New York Press, 2008.

The drama tells of Empedocles' last days as he prepares to renounce life by hurling himself into a volcanic crater on Mount Etna. It employs aesthetic intuition to give insight into the tragic unification of the soul with infinity, an overcoming of temporality and a fusion with immortality. It proclaims that ultimate philosophical meaning is not revealed by way of an act of reason or morality, but by an act of self-abnegation by way of suicide. First philosophy is not a choice between metaphysics and epistemology but a speculation upon the act of self-destruction. There is no other truth than this that better immerses a person in the waters of immortality and thus satisfies all the conditions of the transcendental attitude.

Influence

Hölderlin's time in Weimar was brief but his influence among Weimar and other contemporary German thinkers was considerable. His emulation of the romantic credo, his defence of intellectual intuition, and his postulating of Absolute Idealism was taken up by Schelling, Friedrich Schlegel, Hegel, and others.

Later in the nineteenth century Hölderlin inspired Nietzsche in his reference to the Orphic and Dionysian mysteries (see section 7). Furthermore his poetry was frequently set to music by Weimar composers, including pieces by Peter Cornelius (*Drei Gesängen nach Hölderlin*) and Richard Strauss (*Drei Hymnen von Friedrich Hölderlin*).

Pedagogical Questions

1. To what extent does human intuition reveal reality?
2. Which is better able to express intellectual propositions: rational argument or artistic expression?
3. Which is more fundamental: reason or experience?

Quote:

"I'm coming. Dying? it's only into darkness,
One step; and still you'd love to see, O eye of mine!
You've served your time with me, most serviceable eye!
And now must night awhile surround
My head in shadow. Yet joyous leap
The flames from an intrepid breast. Shuddering
Exaction! What? death alone ignites
My life now at the end, and you extend
To me the terrifying chalice, the fermenting cup,
Nature! that he who sings you drink a draft of it,
His spirit's ultimate enthusiasms!
I am at peace with it; I seek now nothing further than
The site of my own sacrifice. I am well.
O Iris, rainbow over plunging chutes of water.
When jets of silvery mist leap up

My joy will be the way you are." (Hölderlin, Act 2, Scene 6, lines 1897-1912)

Hölderlin, Friedrich. *The Death of Empedocles* [Tod des Empedokles], First Version, trans. David Farrell Krell. Albany, State University of New York Press, 2008.

Introduction to the music

An orchestral tutti avows the insight of darkness (bar 7). Thereafter the wind section betrays that abyss of death alone ignites the flames of peace. Together the music unified reaches unto infinity by way of self-abnegation.

Friedrich Hölderlin: Der Tod des Empedokles [1797-1800]

Philip Armstrong

Allegro Moderato ♩=96 [Erste Gruppe von Jugendlichen]

Piccolo

Flute 1

Flute 2

Oboe

Cor Anglais

Clarinet 1

Clarinet 2

Bass Clarinet

Bassoon

Contrabassoon

Horn 1

Horn 2

Horn 3

Trumpet 1

Trumpet 2

Trumpet 3

Trombone

Bass Trombone

Tuba

Timpani

Violin I

Violin II

Viola

Violoncello

Contrabass

A The insight of darkness

B

Picc.

Fl. 1

Fl. 2

Ob.

C. A.

Cl. 1

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn.

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn.

B. Tbn.

Tba.

1: A, 2: E, 3: B, 4: D

Temp.

Tamb.

Ht-Hat

A The insight of darkness

B

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Cb.

This image shows a page from a musical score, likely for a symphony orchestra. The score is written for a large ensemble, including woodwinds, brass, strings, and percussion. The instruments listed on the left side of the page are:

- Pic. (Piccolo)
- Fl. 1 (Flute 1)
- Fl. 2 (Flute 2)
- Ob. (Oboe)
- C. A. (Clarinet in A)
- Cl. 1 (Clarinet 1)
- Cl. 2 (Clarinet 2)
- B. Cl. (Bass Clarinet)
- Bsn. (Bassoon)
- Cbsn. (Contrabassoon)
- Hn. 1 (Horn 1)
- Hn. 2 (Horn 2)
- Hn. 3 (Horn 3)
- Tpt. 1 (Trumpet 1)
- Tpt. 2 (Trumpet 2)
- Tpt. 3 (Trumpet 3)
- Tbn. (Trombone)
- B. Tbn. (Baritone Trombone)
- Tba. (Tuba)
- Temp. (Timpani)
- Tamb. (Tambourine)
- Hi-Hat. (Hi-Hat)
- Vln. I (Violin I)
- Vln. II (Violin II)
- Vla. (Viola)
- Vc. (Violoncello)
- Ch. (Cello)

The score is divided into measures, with dynamic markings such as *p* (piano), *mf* (mezzo-forte), *f* (forte), and *mp* (mezzo-piano) indicating the volume. The notation includes various musical symbols, including notes, rests, and articulation marks. The page is numbered 19 in the top left corner.

D (death alone ignites) The flames of peace
[Zweite Gruppe von Jugendlichen]

24

Picc. *f*

Fl. 1 *f* *mp* *p* *mp* *p* *p*

Fl. 2 *f*

Ob. *f* *mp*

C. A. *f*

Cl. 1 *f* *mp* *p* *mp* *p* *p*

Cl. 2 *f* *mf* *p* *mp* *p*

B. Cl. *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

Bsn. *mp* *p*

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2 *f*

Hn. 3 *f*

Tpt. 1 *mf*

Tpt. 2 *mf*

Tpt. 3 *mf*

Tbn. *f*

B. Tbn. *f*

Tba.

Temp. *f* *mf* *mf* *f* *mf*

Tamb. *mf* *f* *mf* *f*

Hr-Hat. *mf* *f* *mf* *mf* *mf* *f* *mf* *mf*

D (death alone ignites) The flames of peace
[Zweite Gruppe von Jugendlichen]

Vln. I *p* *p*

Vln. II *p* *p*

Vla. *p* *p*

Vc. *mf* *p*

Cb. *pizz.* *mp*

31

Picc. *p*

Fl. 1 *mf* *mp* *p* *mp* *p* *p*

Fl. 2 *p*

Ob. *p*

C. A. *p*

Cl. 1 *mp* *p* *mp* *p* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *mf* *p*

Cl. 2 *mf* *p* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *mp* *mf* *p*

B. Cl. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *mf* *p*

Bsn. *mf* *p* *f*

Cbsn. *f*

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3 *mp* *p*

Tpt. 1 *p* *f* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *mp* *p*

Tpt. 2 *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Tpt. 3 *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Tbn. *mp* *p*

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp.

T. D. *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Tri. *p*

Vln. I *p* *p*

Vln. II *p* *p*

Vla. *p* *p*

Vc.

Cb.

39


Picc. 

Fl. 1 

Fl. 2 

Ob. 

C. A. 

Cl. 1 

Cl. 2 

B. Cl. 

Bsn. 


Cbsn. 

Hn. 1 


Hn. 2 


Hn. 3 


Tpt. 1 

Tpt. 2 

Tpt. 3 


Tbn. 


B. Tbn. 

Tba. 

Timp. 

Tr. 

Vln. I 

Vln. II 

Vla. 

Vc. 

Cb. 

F Unto infinity by self-abnegation [Erste & zweite Gruppen zusammen]

4/8

Picc. *p* *mf*

Fl. 1 *p* *mf*

Fl. 2 *p* *mf*

Ob. *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f*

C. A. *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f*

Cl. 1 *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Cl. 2 *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

B. Cl. *mf*

Bsn. *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f*

Cbsn. *mf*

Hn. 1 *mf* *mp* *p*

Hn. 2 *mf* *mp* *p*

Hn. 3 *mf* *mp* *p*

Tpt. 1 *p* *mf*

Tpt. 2 *p* *mf*

Tpt. 3 *p* *mf*

Tbn. *mf* *mp* *p*

B. Tbn. *mf*

Tba. *mf*

Trmp. *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

F Unto infinity by self-abnegation [Erste & zweite Gruppen zusammen]

Vln. I *mf*

Vln. II *mf* *f* *p*

Vla. *mf* *f* *p*

Vc. *mf*

Cb. *mf* arco

G

54

Picc. *p* *mf*

Fl. 1 *p* *mf*

Fl. 2 *p* *mf*

Ob. *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f*

C. A. *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *mp*

Cl. 1 *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Cl. 2 *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

B. Cl. *mf*

Bsn. *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *mp* *p*

Cbsn. *mf*

Hn. 1 *mp* *mp* *p* *mp* *p*

Hn. 2 *mp* *mp* *p* *mp* *p*

Hn. 3 *mp* *mp* *p* *mp* *p*

Tpt. 1 *p* *mf*

Tpt. 2 *p* *mf*

Tpt. 3 *mf*

Tbn. *mp* *p* *mp* *p*

B. Tbn. *mp* *p*

Tba. *mp* *p*

Timp. *p* *mf* *mf* *p*

B. D. *f*

G

Vln. I *mf* *pp*

Vln. II *mf* *f* *p*

Vla. *f* *p* *mf* *f* *p*

Vc. *f* *p* *mf*

Cb. *f* *mf*

[H] [Erste Gruppe]

60

Picc. *p*

Fl. 1 *p* *mf* *p*

Fl. 2 *p* *mf* *p*

Ob. *p* *mf*

C. A. *mp* *mp* *p* *mf*

Cl. 1 *p*

Cl. 2

B. Cl.

Bsn. *mp* *p* *p*

Cbsn.

Hn. 1 *mp* *mp* *p* *mp* *p*

Hn. 2 *mp* *mp* *p* *mp* *p*

Hn. 3 *mp* *mp* *p* *mp* *p*

Tpt. 1 *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

Tpt. 2

Tpt. 3

Tbn. *mp* *p* *p*

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp. *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

B. D. *f* *p* *f*

[H] [Erste Gruppe]

Vln. I *f* *p* *mp*

Vln. II *f* *p* *mp*

Vla. *f* *p* *mp*

Vc. *f* *p*

Cb. *f* *mp*

[illegible]

J [Zweite Gruppe]

78

Picc. *f*

Fl. 1 *f* *mp* *p* *mp* *p* *p* *mf*

Fl. 2 *f* *p*

Ob. *f* *mp*

C. A. *f*

Cl. 1 *f* *mp* *p* *mp* *p* *p*

Cl. 2 *f* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

B. Cl. *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

Bsn. *mp* *p* *mf*

Cbsn.

Hn. 1

Hn. 2

Hn. 3

Tpt. 1 *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf*

Tpt. 2 *mf* *mf* *p*

Tpt. 3 *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

Tbn. *f*

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp. *mf* *f* *mf*

Tamb. *mf* *f* *mf* *f* *mf* *f*

Hi-Hat. *mf* *mf* *mf* *mf* *f* *mf* *mf*

Tri. *p*

Vln. I *p* *p*

Vln. II *p* *p*

Vla. *p* *p*

Vc. *mf* *p*

Cb. *pizz.* *mp*

85

Picc. 

Fl. 1 

Fl. 2 

Ob. 

C. A. 

Cl. 1 


Cl. 2 

B. Cl. 

Bsn. 

Cbsn. 

Hn. 1 

Hn. 2 

Hn. 3 


Tpt. 1 

Tpt. 2 

Tpt. 3 

Tbn. 

B. Tbn. 

Tba. 

Timp. 

T. D. 

Vln. I 

Vln. II 

Vla. 

Vc. 

Cb.

[K] [zusammen]

9/1

Picc. *mf* *p*

Fl. 1 *mf* *p*

Fl. 2 *mf* *p*

Ob. *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f*

C. A. *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f*

Cl. 1 *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

Cl. 2 *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

B. Cl. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

Bsn. *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f* *p* *f*

Cbsn. *mf*

Hn. 1 *mp* *p* *mp* *mp* *p*

Hn. 2 *mp* *p* *mp* *mp* *p*

Hn. 3 *mp* *p* *mp* *mp* *p*

Tpt. 1 *mf* *p*

Tpt. 2 *mf* *p*

Tpt. 3 *mf* *mf*

Tbn. *mp* *p* *mp* *p*

B. Tbn. *f*

Tba. *mp* *f* *mp* *f* *f* *p*

Timp. *p* *mf*

S. Cym. *p* *mf*

[K] [zusammen]

Vln. I *mf* *pp*

Vln. II *f* *p* *mf*

Vla. *f* *p* *f* *p* *mf*

Vc. *f* *p* *mf*

Cb. *f* *mf*

arco

97

Picc. *mf*

Fl. 1 *mf*

Fl. 2 *mf*

Ob. *p* *f* *p* *f*

C. A. *p* *f* *mp* *mp* *mp*

Cl. 1 *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

Cl. 2 *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

B. Cl. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

Bsn. *mp* *p* *mp* *p*

Cbsn.

Hn. 1 *mp* *p* *mp* *mp* *p* *mp*

Hn. 2 *mp* *p* *mp* *mp* *p* *mp*

Hn. 3 *mp* *p* *mp* *mp* *p* *mp*

Tpt. 1 *mf* *mf* *p*

Tpt. 2 *mf* *p*

Tpt. 3 *p*

Tbn. *mp* *p* *mp* *p*

B. Tbn.

Tba.

Timp. *mf* *p* *mf* *p* *mf* *p*

B. D. *f* *f* *p* *f* *p*

S. Cym.

Vln. I *mf* *pp* *f*

Vln. II *f* *p* *f* *p* *f*

Vla. *f* *p* *f* *p*

Vc. *f* *p*

Cb. *f*

102

Pic. *mf* *p*

Fl. 1 *p*

Fl. 2 *mf* *p*

Ob. *p*

C. A. *p*

Cl. 1 *mf* *p*

Cl. 2 *mf* *p*

B. Cl. *mf*

Bsn. *mf*

Cbsn. *mf*

Hn. 1 *mf*

Hn. 2 *mf*

Hn. 3 *mf*

Tpt. 1 *mf* *p*

Tpt. 2 *mf* *p*

Tpt. 3 *mf* *p*

Tbn. *mf*

B. Tbn. *mf*

Tba. *mf*

Timp.

B. D. *mf*

S. Cym. *mf*

Vln. I *p* *pp*

Vln. II *p* *pp*

Vla. *p* *pp*

Vc. *p*

Cb. *mp* *pizz.* *p*