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Aesthetic State

[Ästhetische Zustände]

for large orchestra

Introduction

“Aesthetic State” was written for the Staatskapelle Weimar in 2017 and first performed ….

The music is in three sections. The first takes its point of departure from the notion of an aesthetic state developed by Friedrich Schiller. Writing in 1795, Schiller despaired at the horrors of the Reign of Terror in France. The goals of a political and social Enlightenment included the creation of a world safe for reason governed by a rational state, yet the French Revolution and the terror had revealed the vacuity of these goals. Schiller reflected that a society can only achieve civil freedom after its citizens have taken on-board the inviolability of moral action, which in turn requires the capacity for moral freedom. He argued that it is the mental state of the aesthetic that enables the will and its thoughts and feelings to be free, which in turn enables it to choose a moral path. The will is determined by two mental faculties, sensibility and rationality. Each of these does not allow for freedom of thought in itself; however the antagonism created by their interaction enables a development of knowledge characterised by freedom of choice. In the same manner, the music is strongly determined by two different parameters, the homophonic and the contrapuntal, whereby the nature of their interaction shapes the aesthetic experience, which is accordingly characterised by spontaneity and a sense of free-spirited animation.

The second section features a flute melody that asserts a range of ideas in the context of a great diversity of other musical discourse. It interacts with one voice to coordinate material, then correlates with another, and then communicates with something else again in the vast network of ongoing musical meaning. Always the melody adapts according to the context such that it might find common ground with the community of others while at the same time asserting its identity. The music takes its point of departure in the political notion of deliberative democracy, which is a regulative ideal of discursive consultation enabling a community of voices to find agreement from a great disparity of starting positions. It argues that suffrage alone is not sufficient criteria for a mature democracy. It is a model that owes much to the writing of Jürgen Habermas, who argued that societies must develop a pragmatic approach to deliberation that can both contribute towards social congruence and justify the sovereignty of the state and its laws. Conditions of truth cannot be based on Universalist standards independent of conditions of intersubjective communication; they depend upon recourse to satisfactory reasons for asserting the claim and thereafter upon a consensus forming around its acceptability.

The third section features an exploration of meta-aesthetics and meta-ethics by way of representing an entire alternative universe, which is a parallel fourth removed from the known universe, and which is constituted only of parallel fourths. Its epistemics and linguistic conventions are able to describe

how the mountains are comprised not of rock but of parallel fourths, and how the rivers flow not with water but with parallel fourths. By way of the parallel fourth people, the music is able to represent a semantics that associates rational utilitarianism with intersubjective discourse. Just as Schiller argued that freedom enabled moral virtue, so this alternative universe enables a contingency whereby the principles of deliberative democracy and the values of human liberty and emancipation can be made innate to aesthetic and ethical expression, and to musical meaning.

1. Letters upon the aesthetic state

The music of the first section takes its point of departure from the notion of an aesthetic state developed by Friedrich Schiller.

Writing in 1795 in the relative safety of the duchy of Saxe-Weimar, Schiller despaired at the horrors of the Reign of Terror in France. The goals of a political and social Enlightenment included the creation of a world safe for reason governed by a rational state. Yet the French Revolution and the terror had revealed the vacuity of these goals.

Schiller reflected that a society can only achieve civil freedom after its citizens have taken on-board the inviolability of moral action, and that this in turn requires the capacity for moral freedom. He argued that political reform must be based upon the habits and dispositions of individuals, and the very modes of thought employed by a people. A Republic based on civil freedom requires the disposition to moral virtue.

Schiller's *Letters upon the Aesthetic Education of Humanity* (1795) is a philosophical treatise written in the form of a collection of letters dedicated to exploring these issues. It is an attempt to define how moral virtue can be achieved by a people, and how the ideals of the French Revolution might have succeeded. The author argued that these matters require an exploration of the very nature of free will, and the establishment of an inseparable connection between aesthetics and ethics.

In letter XX, Schiller introduced the notion of an aesthetic state as a process of active determinability by which the will of an individual creates thoughts and feelings. The will is determined by two mental faculties, sensibility pertaining to the *a posteriori* empirical realm and reasoning pertaining to the *a priori* rational realm. Each of the faculties does not allow for freedom of thought in itself; the physical world of the empirical is determined according to the laws of nature, and the reasoned realm of the rational is determined by the laws of logic. However the antagonism created by their interaction determines an epistemology of cognitive knowledge characterised by freedom of choice.

Schiller asserted that, consequently, the subjective mind is not determined in itself. It is abstract and without content until exposed to the active determinability of the aesthetic state, and even then it is left unrestrained. He wrote, “The aesthetic state has no limits because it unites all reality.” (1795: XXI)

The first section of the music uses an equivalent model for its construction. The material is strongly determined by two different parameters, the homophonic and the contrapuntal, whereby the nature of their interaction shapes both the musical discourse and its aesthetic, which is accordingly characterised by spontaneity and a sense of free-spirited animation. The music is the invention of a single subjective mind, yet it is not determined in itself. The aesthetic quality of the music is made free and has no limits.

Just as artistic creation is unrestricted by the determined realms of parameters such as the homophonic and contrapuntal, so it has no causal impact upon the same. Schiller argued that the aesthetic state has the same epiphenomenal status. It is indifferent to the determined realms of sensibility and rationality, and it is powerless to determine them in turn. He wrote, “Beauty gives no single result, neither for the mind nor for the will; it does not perform any intellectual or moral purpose; it does not discover any truth, does not help us to fulfil any duty, and, in a word, is equally unable to ground the character or enlighten the head.” (ibid)

Schiller asserted that, nevertheless, given the perception of beauty acts as a mediator between the mental awareness of matter and form, between passivity and activity, and that given this mediation creates freedom of will, both freedom and the liberty associated with social and political emancipation are best achieved by activities that stimulate the perception of beauty, namely appreciation of works of art. Accordingly, for the Enlightenment, the main function of art must be to act upon the individual in a manner that produces an aesthetic state of mind.

Schiller emphasised however that, even if art is able to create freedom of will, it is not the case that the aesthetic condition in itself can necessarily lead to action, including moral action. The perception of beauty cannot be said to yield any direct effect on the will or intellect. Accordingly it is inappropriate to measure beauty by way of the results it produces. Nevertheless, even if it yields no specific moral virtue in itself, still it enables the freedom from determinacy that enables the will to possess the choice of acting virtuously.

Schiller asserted that this further implies the autonomy of art. The experience of an intermediate state between the natural and the civilised necessitates that art must possess its own intrinsic value independent of its social and political purposes. Accordingly, for the Enlightenment, the function of

art is not to teach moral and political duties directly, but to enable the integrity of human wholeness, uniting reason and sensibility in a way whereby human capacities can work in harmony. Indeed, the great value of beauty lies in its capacity to enable freedom.

Schiller emphasised that a free republic committed to the values of the Enlightenment is only possible if citizens first possess virtue and a concern for the public good, which are derived of this freedom. To possess this virtue, citizens must be able to realise the unity of their rational and sensible being by way of disposition. They must be people of moral beauty who, by cultivating art and other educational resources, are free to aspire for high moral goals.

It is the aesthetic state that enables the will and its thoughts and feelings to be free, which in turn enables it to choose an ethical path. Schiller wrote, “As soon as we recognise how we are deprived of freedom by the compulsions derived of nature in our feelings, and by the exclusive regulations derived of reason in our thinking, then we must consider the capacity restored to us by the aesthetic state as the greatest of all gifts, as the very gift of our humanity.” (1795: XXI)

Schiller recognised that an ontological commitment to the notion of an aesthetic state coupled with aesthetic education enabling the highest of moral values possessed a regulative rather than constitutive status. It is an ideal that may never be realised. Nevertheless, for the Enlightenment, it is a goal to aspire to. The aesthetic state coupled with an educated disposition to virtue, prepares the citizen for participating in social life from inclination, not merely from duty. Schiller called these people beautiful souls.

Schiller ended his last letter with an assertion that if there can be a society comprising of beautiful souls, driven by high moral goals by way of acting upon the freedom made possible by the aesthetic state, then there can also be the opportunity to develop a dynamic society that aspires to peace and tolerance through compromise and collaboration. He argued that only in beauty is it feasible to bring together the universal and individual, the will of society as a whole and the interests of the individual.

Schiller asserted, “Taste alone brings concord to society because it creates harmony in the individual. All other forms of mental state divide people because they are based exclusively either on the sensual or spiritual part of their being. Only imagination of the beautiful makes a whole out of a person because their two natures must peacefully co-exist.” (1795: XXVII) He concluded, “In the aesthetic state, even the most disenfranchised individual is still a free citizen, possessing the same rights as the noblest ... Consequently, by way of aesthetic disposition, the idea of equality is fulfilled.” (ibid)

2. Deliberative discourse

The second section of the music features a flute melody that asserts a range of illocutionary statements in the context of a great diversity of other propositional discourse. It interacts with one voice to coordinate material, then correlates with another, and then communicates with something else again in the vast network of ongoing musical meaning. It combines with yet another voice and engages and shares with yet another. Always the melody adapts according to the context such that it might find common ground with the community of others while at the same time asserting its identity.

The music takes its point of departure in the political notion of deliberative democracy, which is a regulative ideal of discursive consultation enabling a community of voices to find agreement from a great disparity of starting positions. It is a model that owes much to the writing of Jürgen Habermas, who argued that societies of the modern era must develop a pragmatic approach to deliberation that can both contribute towards social congruence and justify the sovereignty of the state and its laws. He argued that it is no longer possible, however, to assume Universalist standards. Reason must be released from its metaphysical trappings of the past, including the application of Platonic realism to universals.

Habermas argued against the work of Schiller and his Saxe-Weimar colleagues, and in particular against the theories of constitutive metaphysics outlined by Fichte and Hegel. Commenting on the paradigm underpinning work of their era, Habermas said, "Metaphysics had emerged as the science of the universal, immutable and necessary; the only equivalent left for this later on was a theory of consciousness that states the necessary subjectivist conditions for the objectivity of universal synthetic judgements a priori." (1992: 13)

Habermas argued against the model of consciousness and the associated method of truth claims proposed by Fichte's subjective idealism, which postulated consciousness perceiving itself by way of a mirror effect, identifying itself reflected back in the world of objects. Not only is this reflection an object itself, removed from conscious self-awareness, a kind of empirical ego, but it fails to countenance the possibility of a community of conscious individuals. Instead of explaining the nature of intersubjective discourse, it resorts to solipsism.

Habermas argued further against the absolute idealism of Hegel, which placed both the individual and the community of individuals as dependent on the teleology of a universal mind. Again, it failed to explain the nature of inquiry and discursive deliberation.

Habermas was able to locate the early signs of a break from metaphysical universalism in the work of Schelling whose "reflections already presuppose the premises of a philosophy of consciousness that no longer thinks of the unity of the many as an objective whole prior to the human mind but conceives of it as a result of the synthesis executed by mind itself." (1992: 124) Nevertheless it was not until the developments made in the last hundred and fifty years that there was sufficient means to address these failings. Only then was there access to "the new instruments of representation and analysis that the twentieth century borrows from the post-Aristotelian logic developed in the nineteenth century and then Fregian semantics." (ibid: 6)

Habermas argued that modern post-metaphysical thinking is grounded in the work of linguistic logic developed by Gottlob Frege in the Grand Duchy of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach. "The linguistic turn has placed philosophising on a more secure methodological basis and has led it out of the aporias of theories of consciousness." (ibid: 8)

Habermas argued that, following the consequent work of Wittgenstein and others, conditions of truth cannot be independent of conditions of intersubjective communication. There must be an overcoming of logocentrism, whereby words and language are deemed fundamental expressions of external reality, and instead an emphasis upon pragmatism. Reason must be stripped of its classical absolutism and situated in context. Linguistic meaning is constituted commutatively.

Habermas refuted the very possibility of objective justification. He rejected the paradigm of a solitary subject that confronts objects and, by way of perceiving and representing them mentally, transforms itself into an object. In contrast, he asserted that thought is mediated by language and grounded in the context of social communication. Accordingly acting and speaking are privileged above the representational functions of language, including notions of indubitable facts and justified true belief. Truth claims depend not upon correspondence between any particular statement and its respective state of affairs but upon recourse to sufficient reasons for asserting the claim in communication, and thereafter upon its intersubjective acceptability.

Habermas wrote, "Ultimately, there is only one criterion by which beliefs can be judged valid, and that is that they are based on agreement reached by argumentation. This means that everything whose validity is at all disputable rests on shaky foundations. It matters little if the ground underfoot shakes a bit less for those who debate problems of physics than for those who debate problems of morals and aesthetics." (1990: 14)

Habermas asserted that, despite the rejection of ontological universalism, intersubjective communication pertaining to the ethical can still make appeal to universal validity. In moral

discourse, the community seeks consensus about the rightness of obligatory norms of behaviour. In ethical discourse, the community and the individuals seek consensus about values pertaining to identities and the constitution of sub-communities and the self, which in turn enables authenticity granted by way of the recognition of others.

Discussing discourse ethics, Habermas said, "The problems to be resolved in moral argumentation cannot be handled monologically but require a cooperative effort. […] Moral argumentation thus serves to settle conflicts of action by consensual means. […] Only an intersubjective process of reaching understanding can produce an agreement that is reflexive in nature; only it can give the participants the knowledge that they have collectively become convinced of something." (1990: 67)

Habermas added the proviso that this discourse is always subject to the moral autonomy of the individual, which transcends the status quo of society and any ideal of a universal normative consensus. Accordingly any shared sense of common ground doesn't create a universalism leading to a mono-culture, but instead points to ever greater diversity and tolerance. The more intersubjective communication there is, and the closer this approximates to ideal discourse, the more contradiction and further discourse is required.

Habermas asserted further it is misleading to associate pluralism based on discourse with the notion of relativism. If pluralism is to seek common ground by way of universals, then the claim of relativist truth claims becomes paradoxical. Universal standards require a shared foundation. Pluralism must be redefined in terms of openness to dialogue. A pluralist society is not defined in terms of the total of its constituent absolutes but in terms of a dynamic community engaged in inquiry and dialogue that is capable of openness, and respect.

Accordingly Habermas refuted the neo-conservative conformity of post-modernism, which he argued led to close-mindedness and insular positions. Instead he advocated a restatement of modernism, which best embodied the emancipatory values of pluralistic openness and liberal democracy. Only modernism could provide the context for respectful dialogue and free inquiry.

Habermas argued that this re-invention of modernism should look to the ensuing heritage of Saxe-Weimar thinkers, following the lead of Nietzsche in rejecting positivist explanations of innate structures characterising the natural and human worlds, and following the lead of Frege in using linguistic structures to analyse semantics and thus refuting the speculative subjectivity of the idealist philosophy of consciousness. Commenting upon his own immediate heritage, Habermas stated that, "Even critical theory is finally overtaken by the linguistic turn." (1992: 7)

Habermas acknowledged that the validity of truth claims emanating from a pluralist context placed a crucial importance on the integrity of intersubjective communication. The best argument in discourse can only win through if there is an ideal communicative context.

Habermas insisted that the optimal epistemic conditions for discourse must include a context of integrity whereby each participating individual is a) free from coercion, whether grounded in the self or in the particular situation, b) able to understand the assumptions implied by the context, c) able to share and engage in meaningful communicative acts, d) able to evaluate arguments even-handedly and without prejudice, and e) open and empathetic to alternative perspectives.

Habermas's discourse ethics is frequently used to provide a theoretical foundation for deliberative democracy, which asserts that an authentic component of discursive deliberation within society as a whole can provide greater legitimacy for a sovereign state and its claims to universal justice than suffrage alone, with its recourse to the aggregation of preferences among different interest groups and its tendency to encourage majority dominance over minorities. Deliberative democracy always seeks to achieve a rationally-motivated consensus which is acceptable to all parties.

Deliberative democracy requires that political discourse be situated in an ideal context characterised by the availability of accurate information, and of a balanced and diverse range of arguments. It requires respect for differences of principles and purposes, and a conscientious approach by all to the virtues of others' points of view. It requires a culture of discourse among legislative assemblies, and society as a whole, that is free of political power distortions based on economic disparities, or on interest-group lobbies, and that it is able to show respect for equality of opinion independent of pre-existing hierarchical structures.

Like the flute music, deliberative democracy represents a mature form of social enfranchisement and liberty. It creates less partisanship, more empathy for alternative viewpoints, and more cohesion between people of different cultural backgrounds. It produces ideal epistemic conditions, which accordingly are more likely to enable participants to collectively deduce that which is morally just. It asserts that only decisions based on rational justification and that are satisfactory to all participants can be binding. It endorses the conviction that, despite diverse and seemingly irreconcilable worldviews, practical steps can be taken that enable a community as far as possible to ensure that individuals with contrasting values can live collectively based upon terms acceptable to all.

3. The meta-aesthetics of the parallel fourth people

The music of the third section represents an entire alternative universe, which is a parallel fourth removed from the known universe, and which is constituted only of parallel fourths. Its epistemics and linguistic conventions are able to describe how the mountains are comprised not of rock but of parallel fourths, and how the rivers flow not with water but with parallel fourths. Its music is able to represent how quantum mechanics is described not in terms of probabilities determined by a wave function but in terms of parallel fourths. The music shows how the people of this parallel universe, known as the parallel fourth people, are generally well-disposed by disposition because they consider parallel fourths to be morally virtuous, whereas the people of the known universe, and in particular Weimar resident Johann Sebastian Bach, have long considered parallel fourths to be a moral hazard, and to be avoided at all costs. Bach argued, in terms of known-universe musical conventions, that the presence of a parallel fourth in the context of four-part harmony in particular is tantamount to wickedness and depravity, and all things immoral.

The music of the third section represents this entire alternative universe by way of an investigation into meta-aesthetics and meta-ethics, which in turn underpin the nature of political discourse. The investigation is presented from the perspective of those known as the parallel fourth people, who call themselves the people of the known universe and refer to the people of the previously mentioned known universe as the parallel fourth people. Accordingly, given their epistemics and linguistic conventions, it is represented in musical as well as linguistic terms. It asserts that music can convey not only the aesthetical but also the ethical, and not as a mere tool of social or political action but intrinsically. It asserts the coherence of associating a rational utilitarianism with deliberative discourse.

The people of the parallel fourth universe, who are often down on themselves because their conventions have been unable to associate parallel fourths with virtue, console themselves in a meta-aesthetics and meta-ethics that do not seek to make judgements in themselves, but seek to understand the very notion of ethical properties and statements. They mitigate their despondency by seeking better justifications for how it is possible to judge the good from the bad, the beautiful from the ugly, and the virtuous from the immoral. The people ask, if “stealing from others is wrong” or “parallel fourths in Bach are wrong”, then what makes them wrong?

Without an expedient solution to this question, the people of the parallel fourth universe, in general, do not describe their mountains and rivers in terms of parallel fourths at all, but in terms of realism, whose propositional truth is said to be grounded in an objective mind-independent reality. Similarly their approach to aesthetics and ethics has typically asserted the existence of universal sometimes

reducible to the natural world and sometimes supervening upon some emergent properties not directly connected to the physicalism of the natural world, but part of the real all the same.

That is to say, their realism is applied to many objects that are not concrete particulars. For instance, the Prime Meridian of their planet is to be considered real even though it does not have any substantive physical properties of its own. Similarly the statements "perfect fourths necessarily comprise two pitches a perfect fourth apart" and "perfect fourths are virtuous entities" and "perfect fourths are sublime" are made legitimate to way of their supervenience upon physical objects.

In terms of semantics, given the principle of the conservation of energy, these entities, and even the mind itself, must necessarily reduce to the material. The parallel fourth people assert that if it is possible for individuals to argue so heatedly about aesthetic and moral judgements, and about their own existence, then the truth bearers associated with these cognitive propositions must be genuinely extant. The concepts involved are capable of a truth function. Indeed, in the case of the ethical, only moral realism can account for matters of civil progress, for the Enlightenment project and the overcoming of medieval prejudice and injustice, and so forth.

However, not all parallel fourth people are altogether committed to such cognitivist realism. There are those, for instance, who have pointed out the epistemic regress argument. Any statement of fact requires justification of that fact, but this justification is based upon other facts, which in turn require justification, and so forth.

Furthermore these anti-realists have also pointed to the open-question argument of G. E. Moore (1903), which asserts that moral (and by implication aesthetic) statements cannot by definition be objective. It refutes the identification of moral terms such as goodness and virtue with non-moral terms, whether natural such as in the case of being well-disposed (i.e. happy) or non-natural such as in the case of divine command. In terms of justification, the argument uses the logic of modus tollens: if 'a then b', then 'if not a then not b'. that is to say, if a) a non-moral term such as happiness is identical to a moral term such as good, then b) the question "Is it true that happiness is good?" would mean the same thing as "Is it true that happiness is happiness?" and "Is it true that good is good?" which would be meaningless. Therefore if not a) "Is it true that happiness is good?" is not meaningless; rather it is an open question that can be answered in countless different ways, then not b) non-moral terms are not identical to a moral terms.

In other words, any moral or aesthetic statement, such as "parallel fourths are sublime" must necessarily be indefinable *a priori*, and therefore irreducible to any objective reality. There can be no ontological commitment to aesthetic or moral properties and facts. Indeed, music is not defined by its

constituent sound vibrations, and good is not reducible to evolutionary dispositions; these things are non-cognitive and non-truth apt.

Schiller was one of the first in Weimar, and one of the first among all the parallel fourth people, to endorse the anti-realist notion that aesthetic judgments are non-cognitive. They can shape the cognitive realm, including matters pertaining to taste and duty, but are not cognitive in themselves. As indicated previously, he argued in terms of using the aesthetic component of the transcendent mind to determine freedom. He wrote, "It is only the aesthetic disposition of the soul that gives birth to liberty; it cannot be derived from liberty nor have a moral origin." (1795: XXVI) He was arguing that freedom and liberty are derived from non-cognitive mental functions.

Habermas also endorsed the anti-realism and non-cognitivism associated with the language-games phase of the linguistic turn in philosophy. He argued that knowledge is given cognitive status only by way of intersubjective discourse and not by any would-be reducibility to absolute terms. His universalism is defined in terms of consensus rather than realism.

Another exponent of meta-aesthetic and meta-ethical non-cognitivism among the parallel fourth people was long-time Weimar resident Rudolf Carnap (1935), although in his case the intent was oriented on tidying away the would-be messiness of aesthetics and ethics so as to justify the realism of concrete particulars. In pursuing such a project he argued that any kind of value assertion, whether aesthetic or moral, is merely an intersubjective command set in a deceptive syntax designed to make pretence to grander truth. Thereafter his friend and colleague Alfred Ayer (1936) used the logical positivist criterion of verifiability to determine the non-factuality of moral statements once and for all. He concluded that all ethical (and aesthetic) concepts are unanalysable given that there are no criteria available with which it's possible to test the validity of the judgements in which they occur. He argued they are pseudo-concepts that do not add anything substantive to the factual content of a proposition. Moral statements are expressions of attitudes, not of factual content. They are merely emotivist. Two people may disagree with each other concerning moral sentiments but they cannot contradict one another. It is not possible to establish which argument is right in absolute terms as neither asserts a factual proposition.

By the late twentieth century, the growing band of non-cognitivists, sometimes called projectivists, including Habermas, for all of their differing objectives, had clustered around the theory of Expressivism, which views the purpose of moral and aesthetic language as expressing an evaluative attitude rather than describing any universal reality. It refutes the reducibility of moral sentences and takes the view that there are no absolute moral facts or properties underpinning such statements. Nevertheless it asserts that, in the context of language conventions and interpersonal discourse, such

statements can play a dynamic as well as a meaningful role. It asserts that propositions are given their truth value by normative conventions, either those developed by groups, by the individual, or in terms of an ideal observer.

Some musicians among the parallel fourth people also gravitated to the Expressivist cause. They found it very reasonable to accept that music semantics is not situated in musical grammar or syntax, in the melodic lines or the counterpoint itself, or in the material status of parallel fourths as written on the page. Music is *constructed* from formal elements, but its *meaning* is found in the phenomenology of listening, in the aesthetic experience, in the perception of its expressiveness. It may be used as a tool for alluding to extra-musical content, and even to moral or immoral activities but it is innately non-conceptual; it does not have an intrinsic factuality in itself.

These musicians acknowledged further that this principle applies to all audible experience. Sounds are not perceived as the properties of objects in the world, instead they are perceived as independent of their source events. A faint rumble heard from a mountain-top may be emitted by distant traffic, but the meaning of the sound is not intuitively linked with its source; the sound is given secondary object status. Music has the same standing too. A melody might be generated by a percussion instrument or by computer software, but the perception of its sound is not intuitively linked with the source. The melody is perceived as having its own essence independent of the material world. The melody and the affective qualities of that melody are not reducible to anything else.

Nevertheless, the musicians also asserted that the aesthetic essence of the music, despite its irreducibility, and its non-cognitive status, seems as if it is real, even if it is not. The musical semantic was perceived as substantive and as possessive of an intrinsic factuality, as being cognisant in itself and endowed with life and psychological states.

Sam Trivedi, commenting on the observations of these musicians and of others, argued that while there might be different explanations for a listener perceiving music as innately substantive, by far the most significant involves a condition whereby they “make-believedly animate the music itself so that the music *itself* is imaginatively experienced as *the very being* that is animate and whose emotions are being expressed musically.” (2001: 414) He argued further that when music is afforded primary objective status in this way, then affective matters become associated with it as properties. Trivedi said that, accordingly, “sadness is like a secondary property of the music, a dispositional (and not strictly intrinsic) property of the music that is perceiver-dependent and in particular dependent on our capacity for make-believe.” (ibid: 416)

Trivedi asserted that this phenomenon is exaggerated by resemblances between different aspects of psychology, a concordance between the affective experience of listening to music and the receptivity of the emotions, and between the music's physicalism and the subject's physiology. The experience of listening minimises the epistemological divide between the subjective self and the objective focus of listening. This objectification, even if free of cognitive content, gives the music a strong sense of presence, as if the musical object is very close at hand.

However there were other matters to consider too. Despite its ability to describe the experience of listening to music in this way, these musicians and many others among the parallel fourth people understood that Expressivism was made subject to challenge by the Frege-Geach problem.

As previously indicated, non-cognitivist theories assert that the term 'immoral' referred to in statements such as "It is immoral to tell lies" or the 'sublime' in "It is sublime to listen to the music of J. S. Bach," possess no concepts subject to the standards of realist correspondence; they have no cognitive content. Such judgments are tantamount to saying, "Telling lies makes people feel emotional (angry, betrayed, etc.)" or "Listening to Bach makes people feel emotional (exalted, elevated, etc.)", whereby the propositional stance has no conceptual content of its own with truth-apt status.

The Frege-Geach problem is a response to this assertion developed by Peter Geach and based upon Frege's analysis of the term 'not'. It points out that the meaning of a statement such as "It is immoral to tell lies" when used in a conditional statement such as "If it is immoral to tell lies, then it is immoral to persuade your little sister to lie" loses its so-called emotivist stance and instead takes on conceptual content, and accordingly truth-apt status; yes, it is true that if lying is immoral, then this entails that persuading others to lie is also immoral. Accordingly, Geach argued that the semantic status of moral claims does not behave in the non-cognitivist manner described by Expressivism.

In response to the Frege-Geach problem and other considerations, some parallel fourth people have since proposed a solution based on reconciliation between the realist and anti-realist positions: quasi-realism. Just as music representation is imagined as if it is a real property of the music, even though it is not, so quasi-realism says realism is imagined, or conceived epistemically, as if it has a constitutive status, even though it does not.

Quasi-realism employs a kind of two-dimensional semantics that separates matters of epistemics from those of ontology. It asserts that, rather than expressing truth-apt propositions, ethical and moral statements are a kind of sensibility, which performs in an objective manner in practice, yet exists without any actual objective status. Simon Blackburn, the leading figure asserting this approach,

making reference to David Hume, argued that in describing any aesthetic or moral judgments, which allude to values and knowledge, or probability and modality, or regularity and causality, or representationalism and intentionality, it is possible to make reference to truth, to the facts of the objective world, without any ontological commitment to these facts.

Blackburn described how moral attitudes are projected onto and actualized in objects or events, and how people think and talk as if there were real moral and modal facts pertaining to possibility and necessity, even when there are none. He argued, "The aim is to see these propositions as constructions that stand at a needed point in our cognitive lives - they are the objects to be discussed ... Their truth corresponds to correctness in these mental states ... [and] involves no irreducible appeal to a moral or a modal reality. It is here that the opposition to realism lies." (1993: 55)

However Blackburn added a warning against exaggerating the regulative component of this argument, as if there is some error involved in the actualisation process; there is talk of something existing when in fact that something is false. Denying the constitutive and accepting the regulative is merely a pragmatic move. It is the best-fit explanation. It no more deprives the theory of legitimacy than holding the view that Goethe's theory of colour asserts there are colours, when actually there are none. Indeed, it is an approach that is not substantively different to the *a posteriori* instrumentalism of empirical science. It is easier to explain phenomena if moral properties are postulated as real than if they're not.

Horgan and Timmons have proposed a further solution to the apparent objective status of aesthetic and moral judgments by severing the assumed link between anti-realism and non-cognitivism. They have argued for a Cognitivist Expressivism that "attempts, in its semantic construal of moral terms and the concepts, to account for the deeply embedded features of moral thought and discourse." (2006: 257)

They have sought to address the problem of how Expressivism fails to explain how or why moral discourse so frequently includes claims to objectivity, and how or why it asserts beliefs and views that are comprised of truth-apt content. They wrote, "Beliefs generally, and moral beliefs in particular, are experienced as grounded by a kind of rational authority." (ibid: 267) They asserted further that "In judging that I ought to perform some action—that the action is morally obligatory upon me—I experience a felt demand placed upon my choices and consequent action issuing from the circumstances that I confront (at least as I believe them to be). Thus, phenomenologically, one experiences the demand as having an origin that is 'external' to oneself." (ibid: 268)

The Cognitivist Expressivism of the parallel fourth people, asserting that aesthetic and moral judgments, while not pertaining to universal truths, are nonetheless represented epistemically in terms of universal truths, has been of particular interest to some of its musicians. Given that it adopts the anti-realist components of Expressivism while asserting that the conceptual status of aesthetic and moral statements involves more than merely the expression of an evaluative attitude; it possesses cognitive content, and given that it explains how aesthetic and moral judgements possess the phenomenological, psychological, and functional features associated with justified belief, it is a position that matches well the experience of playing and listening to music.

Consequently, based upon the theories of both quasi-realism and Cognitive Expressivism, musicians of the parallel fourth people have been able to represent, both linguistically and musically, an epistemic able to countenance a justified belief in the truth status of a people in an alternative universe where parallel fourths are considered morally virtuous. They have been able to describe music not merely in terms of a hermeneutic fictionalism, whereby the aesthetic claims embedded in musical discourse are to be considered a form of make-believe, and given truth value according to a moral fiction. Instead they have been able to describe what amounts to an epistemic of Idealism, descended from the Weimar tradition of Schiller, Fichte, Shelling, Hegel and others, whereby the semantics of music, and knowledge of the world, and the truth-bearers associated with this knowledge, are to be considered both epistemically and ontologically as mind-dependent. The music reveals that it is not correspondence with an objective reality that creates coherence, but the unity of mind.

Furthermore, they have been able to describe a meta-aesthetics and meta-ethics that have a great bearing on the nature of social and political discourse. By way of musical representation, it is possible to express not only the virtue and sublimity of parallel fourths but also the cognitive coherence of a semantics that associates rational utilitarianism with intersubjective discourse. Just as Schiller argued that freedom enabled moral virtue, so this Idealism enables a contingency whereby the principles of deliberative democracy and the values of human liberty and emancipation can be made innate to aesthetic and ethical expression, and to musical meaning.

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Orchestration

1 piccolo
2 flutes
2 oboes
1 cor anglais (F)
2 clarinets (Bb)
1 bass clarinet (Bb)
2 bassoons
1 contra bassoon
4 horns (F)
3 trumpets (C)
2 tenor trombones
1 bass trombone
1 tuba
1 timpani (5)
3 percussion

- I) bass drum, large suspended cymbal, hand crash-cymbals
- II) drum kit with tom-toms (3), pedal bass drum, pedal hi-hat, suspended tambourines, standard and ride suspended cymbals, & snare drum
- III) marimba

1 harp
strings

The score is written in C (with standard octave transpositions)
Duration: 15 minutes
Written during 2017

Aesthetic State

Philip Armstrong

1. Letters upon the aesthetic state

Adagietto ♩ = 76

Piccolo
Flute
Flute
Oboe
Oboe
Cor Anglais
Clarinet in B♭
Clarinet in B♭
Bass Clarinet in B♭
Bassoon
Bassoon
Contrabassoon
Horn in F
Horn in F
Horn in F
Horn in F
Trumpet in C
Trumpet in C
Trumpet in C
Trombone
Tenor Trombone
Bass Trombone
Tuba
Timpani

1. Letters upon the aesthetic state

Adagietto ♩ = 76

Violin I
Violin II
Viola
Violoncello
Contrabass


13
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
13
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
Vc.
div.
Cb.


19
23
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
B. D.
Mar.
23
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
Vc.
Cb.
port.
div.
unis.
pizz.


25
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
B. D.
Mar.
div.
port.
unis.
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
Vc.
Cb.
arco
pizz.


30
35
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
1:F♯,2:E, 3:,C, 4:B♭, 5:G
Timp.
Mar.
Vln. I
Vln. II
unis.
Vla.
Vc.
Cb.


36
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
Vc.
Cb.
div.


43
48
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
B. D.
Mar.
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
Vc.
Cb.
port.
div.
unis.
pizz.
arco


50
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
Vc.
Cb.


56
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
Vc.
Cb.
unis.
div.
div.
arco

2. Deliberative discourse



2. Deliberative discourse




75
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
B. D.
Mar.
Hp.
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
Vc.
Cb.
bow the bridge while dampening strings (w/out tone)
unis. (♭)


81
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
Mar.
Hp.
D♮
B♮
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
div.
bow the bridge while dampening strings
(w/out tone)
Vc.
bow the bridge while dampening strings
(w/out tone)
Cb.


86
90
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
Dr.
Mar.
Hp.
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
Vc.
Cb.
tongued without breath
tongued without breath
Ride cymbal
Pedal bass drum


91
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
Dr.
Mar.
Hp.
D♭E♭F♯A♭
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
div.
Vc.
unis.
Cb.


98
96
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
Dr.
snare drum
Mar.
Hp.
98
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
unis.
Vc.
Cb.


101
102
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
Dr.
Mar.
102
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
Vc.
Cb.


107
109
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
Sus. cymbal
Cym.
Mar.
Hp.
F♭G♭
109
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
Vc.
Cb.


114
116
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
Cym.
Mar.
Hp.
116
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
Vc.
Cb.


124
120
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
Dr.
Mar.
Hp.
124
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
Vc.
Cb.
div.
div.


128
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
Dr.
128
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
Vc.
Cb.


133
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
Mar.
Hp.
133
Vln. I
Vln. II
unis.
Vla.
unis.
Vc.
Cb.


140
138
Picc.
Fl.
Fl.
Ob.
Ob.
C. A.
Cl.
Cl.
B. Cl.
Bsn.
Bsn.
Cbsn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
Hn.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
2: D
4: A♭
2: E♭
Dr.
B. D.
Mar.
Hp.
140
Vln. I
Vln. II
Vla.
Vc.
Cb.


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C Tpt.
Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
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D♭
146
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Vc.
Cb.


150
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Vc.
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
154
157
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C Tpt.
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Tbn.
B. Tbn.
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Cb.
div.


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164
Piu molto mosso ♩=88
159
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B. Cl.
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Tba.
Timp.
4:A♮
2: E♮
Dr.
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
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
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Cb.


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Tbn.
Tbn.
B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
4:B♭
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E♭F♯
G♭
E♯
175
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Cb.


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178
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
183
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

3. The meta-aesthetics of the parallel fourth people


197
193
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Tbn.
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B. Tbn.
Tba.
Timp.
B. D.
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Mar.
Hp.
G♭
197
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Vln. II
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Vc.
div.
Cb.


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
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207
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
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Timp.
3:C♯
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214
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
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
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
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
234
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
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
243
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
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
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
258
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
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
268
269
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273
Andante Moderato ♩ = 96
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
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
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285
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
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
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
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305
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
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
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
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